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THE LIMITED PROTECTIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW FOR THE VARIETY ARTS: PROTECTING ZACCHINI,
HOUDINI, AND CIRQUE DU SOLEIL
SARA J. CRASSON*
Variety acts are a ubiquitous, yet frequently ignored, subset of
the performing arts. This article reviews intellectual property law
from the perspective of variety artists, exploring the extent to which
United States laws protect their work and the implications for the
variety arts.
I. VARIEThY PERFORMERS AND THEIR WORK
Variety performers generally present "non-dramatic" acts, per-
formances without a larger, overarching storyline.' Vaudeville, for
example, was full of variety performers, as were European music
halls. 2 A singer or musician may perform as a variety artist when
the artist's performance is not part of a larger dramatic piece. The
category of variety artists also includes novelty performers like jug-
glers, clowns, acrobats, fire-eaters, and circus and sideshow per-
formers. There is an enormous spectrum of variety acts, ranging
from the sublime to the ridiculous. One performer worked in
Vaudeville for years, tap-dancing with a chicken.4 Although Vaude-
ville is gone, the variety arts have survived. Traveling circuses and
Las Vegas shows feature variety artists.5 Many street performers
* Sara Crasson's practice primarily focuses on commercial litigation, includ-
ing intellectual property matters, in the New York office of Mintz, Levin, Cohn,
Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. She received her B.A. from Harvard University,
cum laude, (1997) and her J.D. from Fordham University School of Law (2005)
prior to clerking for the Honorable Judge K. Michael Moore in the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida. She has been studying and performing magic for thirty years.
The author greatly appreciates the work of the staff of the Villanova Sports
and Entertainment LawJournal. She also thanks Professor Andrew Sims, of Ford-
ham University, as well as Jennette Wiser and the staff of the Pace I.P., Sports &
Entertainment Law Forum, for their assistance.
1. See, e.g., FRANK CULLEN, VAUDEVILLE, OILD AND NEW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
VARIETY PERFORMERS IN AMERICA Xi (2007) (categorizing variety acts as "simply a
matter of entertainment" in America, UK, and Australia).
2. See id. at xii ("Both music-hall and variety offered a series of unrelated acts
grouped together on a bill for an evening's entertainment.").
3. See id. at ix (listing types of variety acts).
4. Interview with Robert Reynolds, Library of Magic Castle, L.A., Cal. (c.
1998).
5. See Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus: Meet the Stars, RINoINc BRos.
& BARNUM & BAILEY CIRCUS, http://www.ringling.com/PortalContent.aspx?linkID
(73)
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could be considered variety artists, such as the guitar-playing Naked
Cowboy who was a Times Square fixture for years, as well as mimes,
magicians, acrobats, and dancers.6 "The Ed Sullivan Show" fea-
tured variety acts, and more recently "30 Seconds to Fame," "Steve
Harvey's Big Time Challenge," and "America's Got Talent" have
brought novelty acts to the small screen.7
Variety performers generally have different priorities than sing-
ers, actors, and the authors of books, when it comes to protecting
their work. Unlike most actors, variety artists may play a single role
and spend years creating and honing an act that they may perform
throughout their career. Many also write their own material and
create the act they perform. They usually make their living from
live performances, rather than from appearing on TV or in movies
or selling recordings of their work, so their interest is less in exploit-
ing video of their act then it is in booking additional live perform-
ances. The primary protection desired by variety artists is to
prevent competitors from copying their work.
Also, for some kinds of performers, their act's appeal to an au-
dience is based on novelty. The novelty artist has to show the audi-
ence something they have never seen before: something more
impossible, unexpected, or dangerous than last time. While the
general public may happily listen to a song over and over and de-
mand musicians to perform their classic hits, a magician repeating
feats will be greeted with jeers of "I know that one!" and "I've seen
=1197&parentlD=1181&assetFolderlD=1197 (last visited Sept. 28, 2011) (listing va-
rious acts featured in circus). See also Find Tickets to the Best Las Vegas Shows, LAs
VEGAS.COM, http://www.lasvegas.com/shows/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2011) (listing
wide array of acts performing in Las Vegas).
6. See Randy Kennedy, Horns and Lots of Pushing: Visitors from Texas Blend In,
N.Y. TImNs, Jan. 27, 2005, at B6 available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/27/
nyregion/27cattle.html (describing spectrum of performers that could be variety
acts).
7. See The Ed Sullivan Show, MUSEUM OF BROADCAST COMMUNICATIONs, http://
www.museum.tv/archives/etv/E/htmlE/edsillivans/edsullivans.htm (last visited
Nov. 1, 2011) (listing frequent performers like Elvis Presley and The Beatles, and
noting that show also included performances by dancers, comics, and jugglers,
among others); 30 Seconds to Fame, INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.indb.
com/title/tt0329801/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2011) ("Each half-hour episode . . .
pit[s] approximately 24 acts of diverse talents in 2 rounds of competition."); See
Steve Harvey's Big Time Challenge, CBS, http://www.tv.com/steve-harveys-big-time-
challenge/show/16937/summary.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2011) (describing show
and listing episode summaries which have included performances by acrobats,jug-
glers, snake charmers, martial artists, and human cannonballs). Additionally,
videos of several performers are available on the website. Id. See also America's Got
Talent, NBC, www.nbc.com/americas-got-talent/ (last viewed Nov. 1, 2011) ("The
series is a true celebration of the American spirit, featuring a colorful array of
hopeful stars, including singers, dancers, comedians, contortionists, impressionists,
jugglers, magicians and ventriloquists.").
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that!" A viewer of recent seasons of "America's Got Talent" will re-
call the judges pressing jugglers, acrobats, and other novelty acts for
new, more amazing feats in subsequent rounds, but they made no
suggestions for singers to, for example, hit higher notes.8
Novelty acts are works of art in their own right. Seeing Hugo
Zacchini's Human Cannonball act at a fair, Horace Goldin sawing
through a woman's torso in a theater, or watching Jason Peters put
his head in a lion's mouth in the center ring give audiences a real
thrill.9 Horror movies demonstrate the broad audience for enter-
tainments that shock and frighten. 1o Many novelty acts offer similar
thrills in a live performance, where anything can happen. Unlike
television, which can be edited or re-shot, live performances are in-
herently unpredictable. Things go wrong, performances are not al-
ways exactly alike, the audience has an effect on the performer, and
vice versa. If movies and television shows, which have been care-
fully protected, provide value to society, so would these variety per-
formances; yet, as this article shows, variety artists do not receive the
same incentives and rewards." Intellectual property protections in
the United States have been crafted to protect dramatic perform-
ances but do not meaningfully protect variety acts. This article will
explain the relevant statutes, principles, and cases, then describe
elements of a variety act which a creator may want to protect and
discuss how current United States law applies to those elements.
Finally, this article will review some international approaches and
consider whether additional protections would benefit variety art-
ists in the United States.
II. CURRENT UNITED STATES INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
RELEVANT TO VARIETY PERFORMERS
The United States Constitution provides Congress with the
power "to promote science and the useful arts, by securing for lim-
8. See America's Got Talent, supra note 7 (providing recasts of recent seasons of
America's Got Talent).
9. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 563 (1977); see also
Goldin v. Clarion Photoplays, 195 N.Y.S. 455, 456 (N.Y. App. Div. 1922) (discussing
Goldin's performance in which he saws a woman in half); His Life is just One Big
Circus, DAILY PRESS (Feb. 22, 2004), http://articles.dailypress.com/2004-02-22/fea-
tures/0402220192_I-circus-troupe-animal-trainer-lions (discussing Peters's act of
sticking his head inside mouth of lion).
10. See David Germain, Amityville' Tops Box Office at $23 Million, ALBUQUERQUE
J., April 18, 2005, at A3, 2005 WL 15010782 ("[H]orror movies have become al-
most a sure-thing in Hollywood.").
11. See Zacchini, 443 U.S. at 578 (noting policy goal that public not be "de-
prived of the benefit of [Zacchini's] performance").
75
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ited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their re-
spective writings and discoveries."12 Accordingly, patents and
copyrights are granted for the benefit of the public to give creators
and authors incentives to produce new works by allowing them "to
reap the reward of [their] endeavors."' 3 The Supreme Court ex-
plained that copyrights are "intended to motivate the creative activ-
ity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward,
and to allow the public access to the products of this genius after
the limited period of exclusive control has expired."' 4 The follow-
ing protections have been crafted to encourage the advancement of
science and the useful arts, and have some application, however
limited, to the variety arts.
A. Trade Secrets
Trade secret law acts mainly as an industrial protection, giving
companies legal rights over the techniques, formulae, and devices
they create in hopes of getting an advantage over their competi-
tion.' 5 Archetypal trade secrets are Kentucky Fried Chicken's se-
cret mixture of herbs and spices and the formula for Coca-Cola.
Although international treaties require the United States to offer
protection for trade secrets, each state enacts its own laws.' 6 The
vast majority of states have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
("UTSA").17 UTSA provides protection for information which "de-
rives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not be-
ing generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value
12. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8.
13. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573 (noting State's interest akin to those of copy-
right and patent laws).
14. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984).
15. See RonERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECH-
NOLOGICAL AGE 28-29 (Aspen Publishers, 3d ed. 2003) (discussing trade secret law
goals).
16. See UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 39.2 (1994) (requiring mem-
bers to offer trade secret protection); see e.g., Alaska Stat. §§ 45.50.910 et seq. ("In-
junctive relief for misappropriation of trade secrets."); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 688.001 et
seq. (noting that "Sections 688.001-688.09 may be cited as the 'Uniform Trade
Secrets Act.'"); Va. Code Ann. §§ 59.1-336 et seq. (listing example requirements
for individual states).
17. See Uniform Business and Financial Laws Locator: Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
CORNELL UNIVERSITY LAw SCHOOL (Apr. 2003), http://www.law.cornell.edu/uni-
form/vol7.html#trdsec [hereinafter UTSA] (listing states that have enacted
UTSA). Forty-four states have adopted UTSA. Id.
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from its disclosure or use."' 8 The owner of the information must
take "efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to main-
tain [the information's] secrecy" to maintain protection.' 9 Qualify-
ing for trade secret protection may be simple, but protection is
easily lost. Once precautions are taken, UTSA only protects trade
secret owners against use or exposure by those who obtain the in-
formation through misappropriation, such as "theft, bribery, mis-
representation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to
maintain secrecy, or espionage." 20 If competitors can learn the se-
cret without using nefarious means, for example, by reverse engi-
neering it, taking apart a legitimately obtained product to discover
the secret, they can do whatever they like with it-publish the se-
cret, use it themselves, or give it away.2' Trade secret statutes also
provide no protection if the secret can be discovered by "observa-
tion of the item in public use or on public display."22
B. Patents
Patents allow inventors to reserve the rights to use and exploit
their inventions. Federal law governs the application process, re-
quirements, and the extent of the protection. 23 To be eligible for a
patent, an invention must be the proper subject for a patent, a "pro-
cess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter," which is
also new, useful, and non-obvious.24 In order to receive a patent
and the protection it grants, an inventor must file an application
with the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"). The application
must contain, among other things, enough information about the
invention that others will be able to understand, make, and use it.25
When a patent is issued, the PTO publishes it. Patents are public
documents and are available online.2 6 Once an inventor has re-
18. UTSA § 1(4) (i).
19. UTSA § 1(4)(ii).
20. UTSA §1(1). See § 1(2) (defining "misappropriation").
21. See id. § 1 cmt. 2 (elaborating on policy behind trade secret law of main-
taining standards of commercial ethics).
22. Id. § I cmt. 4.
23. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-105 (2006) (describing conditions for patents and
scope of protection).
24. See id. §§ 101-103 (explaining requirements of patent eligibility).
25. See id. § 112 (noting requirements of specification).
26. See Patent Full-Text and Full-Page Image Databases, USPTO (August 26,
2010), http://www.uspto.gov/patft/index.html (providing access to patents
online).
77
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ceived a patent, the inventor has exclusive rights to the invention
for twenty years and may sue others to stop infringement.27
In addition to the patents described above, design patents are
also available to protect non-functional design elements which are
"new, original and ornamental."2 3 For a design to receive protec-
tion, it must be unique or peculiar, and distinctive.29 Hidden fea-
tures of the design, or internal elements of a device, are generally
not eligible for design patents."o Nor are elements that are re-
quired for the item to function.3' The same general laws apply to
design patents as apply to patents for mechanical devices.3 2 How-
ever, the test for infringement of a design patent asks whether the
patented design and the allegedly infringing design are so similar
that a potential purchaser would mistake one for the other and
purchase the infringing item in error.33
C. Trademarks/Service Marks
Trademark law was created to protect consumers by eliminat-
ing confusion as to the origin of goods.3 4 The theory was that con-
sumers rely on the artisan's mark in selecting which items to
purchase, so a new artisan should be forbidden to use a mark which
was already in use (the "senior mark") because use of the senior
mark would confuse consumers into purchasing the new artist's
goods, of unknown quality, when the consumers meant to buy the
senior mark-holder's goods.35 Service marks serve the same func-
tion for designating services. A service mark is "any word, name,
27. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (a) (2) (2006) (providing term of patent, subject to
payment of fees).
28. Patents for Designs, 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2006) (awarding patents for persons
who "invent any new, original, and ornamental design for an article of manufac-
ture, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of
this title. The provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions shall apply
to patents for designs, except as otherwise provided").
29. See id. § 103 (describing conditions required for patentability, including
non-obviousness).
30. See 69 C.J.S. Patents § 100 (2011) (explaining that it is structure itself that
is eligible for patent, as opposed to method of its operation).
31. See id. (furthering notion that structure is what is patented, not method of
operation).
32. See id. (explaining that distinguishing factor, however, is that appearance
of structure is evaluated in mechanical patents for patentability).
33. See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 676 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (providing test for infringement of design patent where owner bought in-
fringement action against competitor).
34. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 15, at 529-30 (describing background and
purpose of trademark law).
35. See id. (explaining rationale of trademark law).
[Vol. 19: p. 73
6
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol19/iss1/3
2012] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW FOR THE VARIETY ARTS
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof [used] to identify
and distinguish the services of one person and to indicate the
source of the services, even if that source is unknown."3 6
The Lanham Act lays out federal law regarding trademarks and
service marks.37 In addition to words, scents, colors, and shapes,
sounds have been granted trademark protection.3 8 The Lanham
Act also protects against the use of marks (whether or not they are
registered), that are likely to mislead the public about where the
marked goods or services came from, or who sponsors or recom-
mends the goods.39
To receive protection, a mark must be distinctive.40 A mark's
distinctiveness depends on which category the mark falls into: ge-
neric, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful.4 ' If a mark is
classified as suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful, the mark is "inherently
distinctive" and receives protection automatically. 42 If a mark is
classified as either generic or descriptive, it will only receive protec-
tion if a "secondary meaning" attaches to it.43 Secondary meaning
is proven if: (1) actual customers associate the claimed mark with
the particular producer; (2) there has been sufficient advertising
under the claimed mark; (3) the mark has been used sufficiently;
and (4) the producer has had exclusive use of the mark.44 Con-
sumer surveys are often used to prove secondary meaning, but a
36. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining "service mark" under federal trade-
mark laws).
37. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2011) (providing background of trademark
and service marks).
38. See In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1238, 1238-40 (TTAB 1990) (allowing
Plumeria scent as trademark of sewing threads and embroidery yarns); see also
COCA-COLA BOTTLE, Registration No. 696,147 (citing protection of Coca-Cola
bottle shape); NBC CHIMES, Registration No. 523,616 (citing protection of NBC
chime sound); NBC CHIMES, Registration No. 916,522 (citing protection of NBC
chime sound); MGM LION ROAR, Registration No. 7,3555,319 (citing protection
of MGM lion roar).
39. See 15 U.S.C. §1125(a) (2006) (presenting how Lanham Act protects pub-
lic from misleading marks).
40. See Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1064 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
(stating valid mark must be "inherently distinctive" or have taken on distinctive
"secondary meaning").
41. See id. (categorizing marks into increasing levels of distinctiveness).
42. See id. (recognizing suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful marks as "inherently
distinctive").
43. See id. (reiterating that validity established through acquisition of "so-
called 'secondary meaning'").
44. See id. at 1065 (listing factors used to determine "secondary meaning").
79
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broadly advertised mark may eliminate the need for survey
evidence. 45
Once a mark is deemed worthy of protection, the court will
consider whether the competing mark infringes on the protected
mark. When determining infringement, an important element is
the likelihood of confusion. If goods with similar marks are in com-
petition, "infringement usually will be found if the marks are suffi-
ciently similar that confusion can be expected."46 If a customer
would reasonably think the products were related if they had the
same mark, then additional factors come into play.4 7 These factors
are: (1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3) simi-
larity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing
channels used; (6) type of goods and the degree of care likely to be
exercised by the purchaser; (7) defendant's intent in selecting the
mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines. 48 To
prove confusion, the mark owner is not limited to the perception of
the purchaser.4 1 If a third party, upon viewing the allegedly infring-
ing product after a consumer purchased it, would be confused
about the origin of the product, infringement would be actionable,
even if the actual purchaser could not have been confused.5 0
If there is no possibility of confusion, a mark holder can still
prevent the use of a competing mark if the new use of the compet-
ing mark would cause dilution of the senior mark.5' Dilution re-
45. See id. ("Association of a mark with a particular product is most often
proven by use of consumer surveys, though where there has been substantial adver-
tising tinder the mark no such survey is explicitly necessary for secondary
meaning.").
46. See AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979) (quot-
ing Ninth Circuit's determination for whether trademark infringement is
apparent).
47. See id. ("When the goods are related, but not competitive, several other
factors are added to the calculus.").
48. See id. at 348-49 (listing factors that come into play for determining in-
fringement if customer reasonably thinks two products would be related if they
had same trademark).
49. See Lois Sportswear v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1986)
(protecting trademark status of stitching pattern on rear pocket of Levi jeans).
50. See id. at 872-73 (discussing both purchaser and post-sale perception of
general public).
In the instant case, this post-sale confusion would involve consumers see-
ing appellant's jeans outside of the retail store, perhaps being worn by a
passer-by. The confusion the Act seeks to prevent in this context is that a
consumer seeing the familiar stitching pattern will associate the jeans
with appellee and that association will influence his buying decisions.
Id. (citing Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons,
523 F.2d 1331, 1342 (2d Cir. 1975)).
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006) (presenting possibility for mark holder to
prevent use of competing mark in absence of customer confusion); see also East-
[Vol. 19: p. 73
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quires proof of five elements: "(1) the senior mark must be famous;
(2) it must be distinctive; (3) the junior use must be a commercial
use in commerce; (4) it must begin after the senior mark has be-
come famous; and (5) it must cause dilution of the distinctive qual-
ity of the senior mark."52 Dilution can happen in two forms. Either
the mark is blurred by "lessening. .. the capacity of a famous mark
to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the pres-
ence or absence of' confusion or even competition between prod-
ucts, such as making a mark less exclusive; or the mark is tarnished
by associating the mark with some negative quality, like a low-qual-
ity or offensive product.5 3
D. Copyrights
American copyright law grew out of the English Statute of
Anne, which gave an author monopoly rights over the author's
book.5 4 The Constitution provided for copyright laws to "promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts."55 The United States ap-
proach distinguishes our copyright law from its predecessor, as U.S.
copyright laws were not intended primarily to protect the author,
but to encourage creativity and the creation of new works for the
benefit of the public.5 6 Current copyright law is embodied in the
1976 Copyright Act, which has since been amended and modified
several times. 5 7 The federal law preempted protections that had
already been articulated in state statutes and in common law.58
man Photographic Materials Co. v. Kodak Cycle Co., [1898] EWHC (Pat) 15 R.P.C.
105 (Eng.) (holding that even though use of name Kodak for bicycles would not
cause confuse public, it injures original mark owner by making mark less exclu-
sive); Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 26, April 15, 1994,
33 I.L.M. 119 (discussing protection against dilution of trademarks was also re-
quired by TRIPS).
52. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 217 (2d Cir. 1999) (find-
ing crackers produced by Nabisco diluted Pepperidge Farm's trademark of "or-
ange, cheddar cheese-flavored, fish-shaped crackers").
53. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (presenting two forms of dilution); see also Hormel
Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding
that Muppet character "Spa'am" in Muppet Treasure Island, porcine barbarian chief-
tain, did not tarnish tinned meat trademark).
54. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 15, at 320 (presenting fact that American
copyright law grew out of English law).
55. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (stating that U.S. Constitution promotes
progress of science and arts for copyright considerations).
56. See id. (indicating how U.S. laws distinguish from English law in that U.S.
laws promote benefit to public at large instead of individual authors).
57. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 15, at 322 (acknowledging amount of times
U.S. copyright laws have been amended).
58. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1998) (presenting federal law text acknowledges for
preempting state laws); see also MERGES ET AL., supra note 15, at 322 (explaining
81
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To be eligible for a copyright, a work must be the proper sub-
ject matter for a copyright. The federal statute protects:
[0]riginal works of authorship fixed in any tangible me-
dium of expression . . . from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated .... Works of
authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying
words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying
music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works
(5) pictorial, graphic and sculptural works
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.59
"Literary works" does not refer to a level of quality or artistic
merit. "[C]atalogs, directories, . . . instructional works, compila-
tions of data [,] computer data bases, and computer programs . . ."
all qualify for protection.60 In addition to the precise text of the
work, copyright law proscribes too-close imitation, else a "plagiarist
would escape liability by immaterial variations."6' Sections (3) and
(4) protect fixed directions for performing "dramatic works" and
"pantomimes and choreographic works."62 A dramatic work has
been defined as a performance that tells a story in a way that the
audience perceives the events as unfolding in front of them, rather
than being described to them.6 3 Pantomimes are performances of
silent gesture, and the term "choreographic works" is usually inter-
how federal law preempted certain state laws to offer certain copyright
protection).
59. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1990) (presenting eligibility requirements for protec-
tion under federal copyright law).
60. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 (1976) (exemplifying what Congress intended
to qualify for protection).
61. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures, 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (describ-
ing importance of not limiting protection of literary property to text alone).
62. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1990) (highlighting two areas of subject matter cov-
ered by copyright law).
63. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 2.07[A] 2-60 (2007) (citing Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 61 (1911)).
Nimmer illustrates that ballets, or similar performances, are copyrightable, but so-
cial dancing is not. See also 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1990) (defining protection for dra-
matic works under copyright law).
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preted to cover dance performances. 64 Under the 1909 Copyright
Act, only dramatic choreographic works or pantomimes were pro-
tected.65 Protection was expanded to include non-dramatic
pantomimes and choreographic works in 1976.
Copyrights protect the expression of the idea, but do not pro-
tect the underlying concept. The work to be protected must be
original and recorded in a "tangible medium of expression," like a
script, video, or set of choreography notations. 66 The copyright
owner receives exclusive rights to copy, distribute, perform, display,
and create derivative works or compilations of the copyrighted work
for the life of the author plus seventy years, or ninety-five years from
publication, if the author is an entity, rather than an individual.67
To enforce these rights, a copyright owner may sue for in-
fringement. She must prove that the infringer made unauthorized
copies of her work, either by showing direct evidence of copying or
proving that the infringer had access to her work and that the alleg-
edly infringing work is substantially similar to hers. A plaintiff
shows access by proving the defendant had an "opportunity to view
or to copy plaintiffs work."68
The substantially similar elements must be protectable por-
tions of the original work."9 Since expressions, and not ideas, are
protected under copyright law, a court will only consider similarity
of expressions. 70 However, not all elements of expressions can be
64. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 63, § 2.07[B] 2-70 (providing usual in-
terpretations for pantomimes and choreographic works).
65. See MERGS er AL., supra note 15, at 370 (describing limited scope of 1909
Copyright Act).
66. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010) ("A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of
expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the au-
thority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be per-
ceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than
transitory duration.").
67. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1998) (noting timeline for copyright protection).
68. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562
F.2d 1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that defendant must have had reasonable
opportunity to see plaintiffs work). Mere speculation of access is not sufficient to
infer access. See Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1049 (C.D. Cal.
2001) (holding that it is impermissible to infer access "through mere speculation
or conjecture").
69. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 63, § 13.03[A][11[e], at 13-52 to 13-53
(noting if there is "nonliteral similarity" only in relation to particular segment of
plaintiffs work, and this segment is "a copyrightable portion of a collective work,"
then substantial similarity requirement may not apply).
70. See Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1398 (9th
Cir. 1997) (noting substantial similarity does not apply to "similarity of ideas or
concepts").
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protected.7' A plaintiff cannot rely on unprotectable elements to
show similarity, and these elements must be "identified, or filtered,
before the [original and allegedly infringing] works can be consid-
ered as a whole." 72 There are also several specific limitations on
protection for expressions of the same or similar ideas.
The merger doctrine limits protection for expressions of an
idea if there are a limited number of ways to express an idea, or if
"the expression provides nothing new or additional over the
idea."73 Courts will consider the idea and the expression of the
idea to merge, and will refuse to enjoin subsequent substantially
similar expressions in order to avoid prohibiting all future use of
the idea.74 For example, in one case, a particular design for ajew-
eled brooch in the form of a bee merged with the idea of a jeweled
bee-shaped pin, and a similar design could not be enjoined.75 Ap-
plication of the merger doctrine will hinge on how narrowly or
broadly a court defines the idea being expressed.76 Once a court
deems that idea and expression have merged, the original "will only
be protected against nearly identical copying."77
Stock elements in a work also cannot be protected. These
"scenes A faire," or "scenes which must be done," are so common
and expected in certain works that there is no originality in includ-
71. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir.
1994) (noting that some "limiting doctrines" are applied to protection of
expressions).
72. See id. at 1446 (affirming principle that party claiming infringement may
not establish similarities in expression which stem from un-protectable elements).
73. See Krofft Television Prods., 562 F.2d at 1168 (detailing requirements for
expressions with respect to merger doctrine); see also Morrissey v. Procter & Gam-
ble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1967) (finding that where subject matter allows
for, at most, limited number of forms of expression, copyrighting is
inappropriate).
74. See Morrissey, supra note 73, at 678-79 ("[T]to permit copyrighting [in such
circumstances] would mean that a party or parties, by copyrighting a mere handful
of forms, could exhaust all possibilities of future use of the substance"); see also
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 63, § 13.03[B] [3], at 13-86 (providing theoretical
overview of merger doctrine).
75. See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 739, 742
(9th Cir. 1971) (holding that idea and expression of bee pin design were indistin-
guishable). But see Maggio v. Liztech Jewelry, 912 F. Supp. 216, 223-24 n.5 (E.D.
La. 1996) (maintaining that idea of jewelry pin did not merge with expression
because of unique and original arrangement of jewels).
76. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 63, § 13.03 [B] [3], at 13-88.3 to 88.4
(recognizing application of merger doctrine hinges on definition of "idea," and
discussing conclusions reached by several courts on this issue).
77. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1444 (9th Cir.
1994) (citing Krofft Television Prods., 562 F.2d at 1167-68) (describing occurrence
which prompts protection against nearly identical copying).
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ing them.78 Certain characters, settings, or events are practically
indispensable to a genre.79 For example, in the context of a magic
show, a magician dressed in top hat and tails, using a black wand
with white tips, and pulling a rabbit out of a hat would all be consid-
ered scenes A faire, and could not be used to establish substantial
similarity. 0 As in the case of merged expressions, scenes A faire are
only protected if the copy is almost identical."'
In addition to individual works, an author may copyright a
compilation, which is "formed by the collection and assembling of
preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or
arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole consti-
tutes an original work of authorship."82 The underlying elements
in the compilation do not have to be copyrightable by the creator
of the compilation, but only the creator's additions or the compila-
tion as a whole will be protected by the compilation's copyright.8"
In a compilation copyright claim, "protection may extend only to
those components of a work that are original to the author."8 4 For
example, in Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Company, the Ninth
Circuit agreed with the district court that even though the text and
images on Roth's greeting cards were not original, and no individ-
ual element on the cards was copyrightable, a card should be con-
sidered as a wholeY5 Looking at the overall card, the court found a
78. SeeSchwarz v. Universal Pictures Co., 85 F. Supp. 270, 275 (S.D. Cal. 1945)
(defining "scenes :! faire"); see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 63,
§ 13.03[B] [4], at 13-88.5 (explaining that scenes A faire doctrine often immunizes
individual from liability if similarity of plots follows from common theme).
79. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 63, § 13.03[B][41, at 13-88.5 (noting
that elements, including characters, are unprotected if they are "as a practical mat-
ter indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given [idea]"); see also
Apple Computer, 35 F.3d at 1444 (quoting Frybarger v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 812
F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1987)) (using "as a practical matter indispensible" language
to reiterate that such basic ideas are not protected).
80. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 63, §13.03[B] [4], at 13-88.4 to 13-88.7
(discussing generally examples of scenes A faire and their unprotected nature).
81. See Apple Computer, 35 F.3d at 1444 (affirming well-recognized principle
that "when an idea and its expression are indistinguishable," expression is only
protected against "nearly identical copying").
82. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010) (providing definitions).
83. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) ("The copyright in a compilation or derivative work
extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distin-
guished from the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply
any exclusive right in the preexisting material.").
84. Feist Publ'ns., Inc., v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991)
(describing how copyrights do not necessarily protect every element of work).
85. See Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir.
1970) ("[T]here was substantial evidence to support the district court's finding
that the textual matter of each card, considered apart from its arrangement on the
cards and its association with artistic representations, was not original to Roth and
85
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valid copyright, and held that United Card Company's card in-
fringed on Roth's copyright because the "total concept and feel" of
the cards were the same and the similarity between the cards was
clear to a casual observer.8 6
Accordingly, the more original a work, the more protection
copyright law gives it. If a work is made mainly of scenes A faire or
expressions that merge with the ideas they represent, the work will
only get "thin" protection from "nearly identical copying."87 If the
work is more original, it will receive broader protection."8
The proper test for determining substantial similarity varies
among jurisdictions. The traditional test in the lower courts is the
audience test.89 That test hinges on the "spontaneous and immedi-
ate" reaction of the ordinary person.90 If the work is aimed at a
particular audience, the court will consider the reaction of that au-
dience, rather than the reaction of the general public.9'
The Second Circuit still uses the audience test, judging "sub-
stantial similarity 'by the spontaneous response of the ordinary lay
observer' to the protectable elements of the works.92 In Arden v.
Columbia Pictures Industries,9 3 the court compared the novel "One
Fine Day" with the film "Groundhog Day."94 While both works used
the idea of a man forced to relive the same day over and over, the
court found that no reasonable jury could find the protectable ele-
therefore not copyrightable. However, proper analysis of the problem requires
that all elements of each card, including text, arrangement of text, art work, and
association between art work and text, be considered as a whole.").
86. See id. at 1110 ("The test of infringement is whether the work is recogniza-
ble by an ordinary observer as having been taken from the copyrighted source.")
(quoting White-Smith Music Pub. Co., v. Apollo Co. 209 U.S. 1, 17 (1907)).
87. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1444 (9th Cir.
1994) (explaining doctrine of scenes ;i faire); Feist Publ'ns., 499 U.S. at 357-58
("[T]he principal focus should be whether the selection, coordination, and ar-
rangement [of facts] are sufficiently original to merit protection. Not every selec-
tion, coordination, or arrangement will pass muster.").
88. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992)
(illustrating that works of fiction and works that are less functional receive more
copyright protection than works that are mostly based on facts).
89. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note, 63, § 13.03[E] [1] 13-82 and accompa-
nying text for examples of cases applying the audience test.
90. Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 18 (9th Cir. 1933).
91. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562
F.2d 1157, 1164-66 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that since work was aimed at children,
children's reactions were determinative in establishing substantial similarity be-
tween work in question and copyrighted work).
92. Arden v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 908 F. Supp. 1248, 1258 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (quoting Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 51 (2d Cir. 1986)).
93. 908 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
94. See id. at 1249-50 (describing case in which novel and movie made twelve
years later both tell story about man who relives same day repeatedly).
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ments in the two works to be substantially similar. 5 The court re-
viewed the various elements the plaintiff claimed were similar, and
noted that while there are similar elements-using knowledge
gained in previous repetitions of the day, breaking the alarm clock
that wakes them with the same recording every morning, and char-
acters committing suicide-the similar ideas are "expressed
through different details" in the two works.96
In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 97 the Su-
preme Court applied a different test.98 Because the works at issue
in Feist were two telephone directories, an audience's view of simi-
larity between the two works would not have been terribly enlight-
ening, one phone book being much like another.99 That Court
applied a more critical analysis. It identified the material in Feist's
directory that was not copyrightable, and eliminated it from the
similarity comparison.100 Then, the Court determined that since
Rural Telephone Service had only copied non-protectable elements
from Feist's directory, there was no infringement.' 0
A two-part test for substantial similarity has been developing
since 1946.102 In Arnstein v. Porter,'0 plaintiff Arnstein sued song-
writer Cole Porter for violating Arnstein's copyright in a piece of
music.' 0 4 The court noted that the proper procedure would be to
first consider if the defendant had copied, allowing critical analysis
95. See id. at 1260 (reasoning that One Fine Day had much more "complex
plot" and was much more detailed and developed than Groundhog Day, which was
"light-hearted comedy," and that, while stories had some similarities, "plot and fun-
damental essence" of works differed).
96. See id. at 1262-63 (showing that even though there are multiple examples
of similarities between novel and film, similarities are "insubstantial or pertain to
noncopyrightable ideas").
97. Feist Publ'ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
98. See id. at 361-64 (laying out two-part test to establish copyright
infringement).
99. See id. (analyzing differences in phonebooks and creative content versus
purely factual information); see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 63,
§ 13.03[E] [1] [b] (discussing Court's reasoning in Feist).
100. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 361-62 (determining that although plaintiff discov-
ered and recorded names to compile phone book, information was raw data and
factual, and as such, not able to be copyrighted).
101. See id. at 363-64 (asserting facts plaintiff used in its phone book were not
original and would continue to exist even if plaintiff never published phone book;
the underlying material in phonebook therefore failed originality requirement for
copyright protection).
102. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946) (outlining
essential, separate elements needed in order to recover on copyright infringement
claim).
103. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
104. See id. at 467 (noting plaintiffs cause of action for copyright infringe-
ment regarding musical pieces). Cole Porter wrote "Anything Goes," "Don't Fence
87
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and expert testimony to inform the decision.10 5  If copying was
found, the test would then require application of the old audience
test, without any critical dissection of the works, to decide if enough
of the original work had been appropriated to support the plain-
tiff's claim.111
In Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonalds
Corp.,'1 7 the Ninth Circuit provided a slightly different two-part test
for infringement. First, the court applied an extrinsic, or objective,
test. 08 Using expert testimony and step-by-step analysis, a court ob-
jectively determines whether the ideas are substantially similar. 09
The court may consider the ideas, the type of work, materials used
in the work, the subject, and the setting.' Io The extrinsic test may
"require [ ] a comparison of plot, theme, dialogue, mood, setting,
pace and sequence."' I
If the court finds similarity, it continues to the intrinsic/subjec-
tive test, to determine if "there is substantial similarity in the expres-
sion of the ideas so as to constitute infringement."" 2 In this second
part of the test, no expert testimony or analysis is allowed. The is-
sue is whether a casual observer would notice a similarity in the
"total concept and feel of the works."' 13
The extrinsic first prong of the Krofft test has continued to de-
velop in the Ninth Circuit and is no longer restricted to comparing
ideas." 4 The first prong "now objectively considers whether there
are substantial similarities in both ideas and expression," and the
Me In" and "De-Lovely," among other songs. See generally id. (introducing defen-
dant as composer).
105. See id. at 468 (discussing different approaches to determine whether cop-
ying occurred).
106. See id. (addressing second prong of similarity test).
107. Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonalds Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th
Cir. 1977).
108. See id. at 1164 (addressing components of extrinsic test).
109. See id. (emphasis added) (explaining extrinsic test's reliance on "specific
criteria").
110. See id. (listing "specific criteria").
111. See Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir. 1984) (citation
omitted) (listing factors helpful for determining similarities between ideas), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
112. See Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1358 (9th Cir. 1990) (emphasis
added) (citation omitted) (discussing application of intrinsic-subjective test).
113. See Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000)
(describing second prong of two-part extrinsic/intrinsic test to determine similar-
ity in works of art).
114. SeeApple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir.
1994) (discussing evolution of extrinsic test).
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second prong continues to subjectively compare only expression.' '5
The Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp." 6 court suggested three
steps for evaluating the first prong in 1994.' 7 First, the plaintiff
lists the similar elements between the plaintiffs work and the alleg-
edly infringing work." 8 Second, the court uses analyses and expert
opinions to decide which elements named by the plaintiff in step
one are protected under a copyright and which are unoriginal,
merged with the idea, scenes A faire, or otherwise non-protect-
able.' 19 Finally, the court determines the scope of protection due
to the plaintiffs work, either "broad" or "thin" protection. 120 A
plaintiff whose work merits thin protection will only receive a find-
ing of infringement for practically identical copying.' 2 ' Courts
grant works broader protection when they decide the work repre-
sents artistic choices made from a wide realm of possibilities for
artistic expression, and so should allow a finding of infringement
for non-identical copying.122 The level of protection is decided on
a case-by-case basis.123
Applying the second prong of the Krofft test has remained es-
sentially the same since its inception. For example, in Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Film Ventures International, Inc.,124 in which the defen-
dant stipulated to the first prong of the test for the purpose of chal-
lenging the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction, 2 5 the
115. See id. (explaining present-day application of two-part test).
116. 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994).
117. See id. at 1443 (discussing helpful steps to determine scope of copyright
protection).
118. See id. (explaining step one of test).
119. See id. (noting step two of test). For example, in Apple Computer, the
court used a great deal of technical knowledge to establish which elements of the
graphical user interface were worthy of copyright protection. See id. at 1444-45
(describing "ideas" that fell under scope of copyright protection).
120. See id. at 1443 (finding "the court must set the appropriate standard for a
subjective comparison of the works to determine whether, as a whole, they are
sufficiently similar to support finding of illicit copying").
121. SeeFrybarger v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 812 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1987)
(indicating that in cases of thin protection "the mere indispensable expression of
these ideas . .. may be protected only against virtually identical copying.") (empha-
sis in original).
122. See McCulloch v. Albert E. Price, Inc., 823 F.2d 316, 321 (9th Cir. 1987)
(holding that decorative plates and other artistic works which "are not factual re-
ceive much broader protection under the copyright laws because of the endless
variations of expression available to the artist") (citation omitted).
123. See Apple Computer, 35 F.3d at 1447 ("Which end of the continuum a par-
ticular works falls on is a call that must be made case by case.").
124. 543 F. Supp. 1134 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
125. See id. at 1137 ("For the purposes of this motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion, Defendants have stipulated that the general idea of both 'Jaws' and 'Great
89
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defendant agreed that the basic idea of its film, "Great White," was
substantially the same as the plaintiffs film, 'Jaws."12 6 The court
proceeded to perform the second prong of the Krofft test and found
it likely "that a jury, applying the intrinsic ordinary observer test,
would find the [protectable] expression of ideas in [the motion pic-
tures] 'Jaws' and 'Great White' to be substantially similar."12 7 The
court found the "local politician," the "salty, English-accented skip-
per," the "local shark expert," and the "local police chief' to be
similar characters in both films.' 28 Additionally, significant scenes
and plot points appeared in both films and major characters met
similar fates.' 29
E. Unfair Competition
Unfair competition is a rather amorphous civil tort.13 0 The
purpose of making unfair competition a civil tort is to encourage
competition by enforcing a fair playing field. 3 1 The Paris Conven-
tion for the Protection of Industrial Property defined unfair compe-
tition as "[a]ny act of competition contrary to honest practices in
industrial or commercial matters . . . ."132 One commentator iden-
tified three types of unfair competition: creating confusion with a
competitor; lying and discrediting a competitor; and misleading the
public about the quality of your goods.'3 3
White' is the same, and, thus, the first prong of the bifurcated substantial similarity
test . . . has been satisfied.").
126. See id. at 1136-39 (discussing similarities between 'Jaws" and "Great
White"). Universal City Studios took place before Apple Computer, so the first prong
of the Krofft test was still restricted to evaluating similarities between ideas, and did
not consider the expression itself. See id. at 1134 (noting that case was decided in
1982).
127. See id. at 1141 (finding sufficient similarity of expression for preliminary
injunction).
128. See id. at 1137 (discussing similarities between characters of "Jaws" and
"Great White").
129. See id. at 1137-39 (describing numerous plot similarities between "Jaws"
and "Great White").
130. SeeJ. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPE-
TITION § 1:8 (4th ed. 2011) (stating that "challenge [of unfair competition] is to try
to accurately define in the abstract the shape of that tort").
131. See id. (explaining that "American law sets a minimum level of 'fairness'
in competition. In other words, it is illegal to compete 'too hard'").
132. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 10bis,
Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
133. See MCCARTHY, supra note 130 (stating that there are "three specific types
of unfair competition: all acts that create confusion with the company, goods or
activities of a competitor; false allegations that discredit a competitor; and indica-
tions that are liable to mislead the public as to things such as the nature or quali-
ties of the goods").
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In the United States, the doctrine of unfair competition is
broad and comes into play in conjunction with a variety of other
laws. The Federal Trade Commission and several states find unfair
competition if: "(1) ... the practice ... offends public policy ... [by
being] within at least the penumbra of some common law, statu-
tory, or some other established concept of unfairness; (2) [the con-
duct] is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; [and] (3)
[the conduct] causes substantial injury to consumers [competitors
or other businessmen]."1 3 4 The law of unfair competition distin-
guishes between following the example of a competitor, which en-
courages competition and is permissible, and "the slavish or
systematic appropriation of the result of his [work] in order to
spare the cost of one's own," which is impermissible.' 3 5 There are
many types of unfair competition, including: "passing off," when
an infringing party "confuse[s] the public into thinking the plain-
tiff endorses, sponsors or licenses the defendant's work, product, or
use of the characterization; "misappropriation," using the plaintiffs
character; violating a right of publicity; infringing on trademarks or
trade dress; confusing customers by using similar names for busi-
nesses, artistic works, or goods; using "bait and switch" sales strate-
gies; false advertising; and stealing trade secrets, among others.' 3 6
In the world of entertainment, unfair competition law has
been used to protect elements of an act not covered by traditional
intellectual property laws.' 37 For example, courts have awarded in-
junctions to the owners of the Lone Ranger character against indi-
viduals making public appearances on horseback while wearing
masks and calling out "Hi yo, Silver!"138 Even distinctive voices and
styles have been protected against imitators. In particular, one
134. See Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 501 (2d
Cir. 2000) (citing Saturn Const. Co. v. Premier Roofing Co., 238 Conn. 293, 310-
311 (1996)) (holding that cybersquatting was not unfair competition under Con-
necticut's proscription of "unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices").
135. See Louis ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION, TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLIES § 15:22 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing distinction
between "merely following the 'tip' of a rival" and methodical appropriation).
136. See McCARTHY, supra note 130, at §§ 1:10, 10:45, 10:47 (listing types of
conduct labeled unfair competition, passing off trademark infringement, and dis-
cussing misappropriation doctrine).
137. See Protection Against Unfair Competition, ESA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
(Dec. 8, 2004), http://www.esa.int/esaMI/IntellectualProperty-Rights/SEMV0T
9DFZD_0.html (discussing protection against unfair competition).
138. See Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Cox, 124 F.2d 650, 651-52 (4th Cir. 1942) (hold-
ing plaintiff entitled to relief against defendant who played "Lone Ranger" part in
circus); see also Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Currey, 79 F.Supp. 190, 198 (M.D. Pa. 1948)
(enjoining defendant from using words "Lone Ranger").
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court sustained Burt Lahr's unfair competition claim against a
chemical company using an imitation of his voice as the voice of
their cartoon "spokesduck." 3 9 In another case, Bette Midler won a
suit against Ford Motor Company, who hired one of Midler's for-
mer backup singers to imitate her performance when she refused
Ford's request to use her single "Do You Want to Dance" in a televi-
sion commercial.14 0
Unfair competition claims are not limited to voice imita-
tions.1 4' In Prouty v. National Broadcasting Co.,1 42 the author of the
novel Stella Dallas, sued the broadcaster of a radio show based on
future events in the life of her book's eponymous heroine."' 3
Prouty was devastated that her maternal "working-class heroine" was
being turned into the subject of a "sentimental melodrama." 44 Al-
though the district court sustained her unfair competition claim
through National Broadcasting's motion to dismiss, she was unable
to stop the broadcasts.' 4 5
Imitation of a performer's style does not always provide a sus-
tainable unfair competition claim.'6 In Shaw v. Time-Life Records,'147
the court ruled that Artie Shaw, the swing-era bandleader, could
139. See Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir. 1962) (finding
defendant's commercial was enhanced by voice imitation). In addition, Burt Lahr
was best known for his performance as the cowardly lion in the 1939 motion pic-
ture version of The Wizard of Oz. See Bert Lehr, Puiu Ic BROADCASTING SERVICE (Oct.
15, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/broadway/stars/lahr-b.htnl (recounting bi-
ographical information of Bert Lehr).
140. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (reinstat-
ing her claim after dismissal in lower court). In addition to her unfair competition
claim, Bette Midler also had a right of publicity claim against Ford Motor Com-
pany. See id. (finding defendant appropriated Midler's identity). A jury awarded
Bette Midler $400,000 in damages. See Midler v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., Nos. 90-
55027-28, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 22641, at *2 (9th Cir. July 16, 1991) (affirming
judgment of district court).
141. See Prouty v. Nat'1 Broad. Co., 26 F. Supp. 265, 265-66 (D. Mass. 1939)
(denying motion to dismiss unfair competition claim for novel).
142. 26 F.Supp. 265 (D. Mass. 1939).
143. See id. at 265-66 (describing plaintiffs claim).
144. See Lynn Gordan Hughes, Olive Higgins Prouty, DICTIONARY OF UNITARIAN
& UNIVERSALIST BIOGRAPHY, http://www.uua.org/uuhs/duub/articles/olivehiggins
prouty.html (last visited April 9, 2005) (discussing Prouty's reaction to radio
broadcast).
145. See Prouty, 26 F.Supp. at 266 (denying defendant's motion to dismiss);
Hughes, supra note 144 (stating inability to prevent broadcasts).
146. See, e.g., Shaw v. Time-Life Records, 38 N.Y.2d 201, 207-08 (1975) (ruling
that summary judgment was properly denied in regards to unfair competition
claim). Artie Shaw, an alto saxophone player, was considered to be one of the top
bandleaders in swing. See Artie Shaw, HEP JAZZ, www.hepjazz.com/bios/artieshaw.
html (last visited Nov. 2, 2011) (detailing career of prominent saxophone player
and bandleader).
147. 38 N.Y. 2d at 201.
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not enjoin others from copying his "sound." 4  The court held that
as long as the imitator did not present his product as being Shaw's
or cause confusion about the source of the recording, another mu-
sician could copy Shaw's performance style.' 4 9 Another court ruled
in favor of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company in Nancy Sinatra's
suit against the company for a tire advertisement using a version of
Ms. Sinatra's signature song, "These Boots Are Made for Walking,"
imitating her arrangement.150 After listening to the two recordings,
the court found Sinatra's recording indistinctive, and held that
there was no "confusion of source" between the two works.'' Also
found relevant was the fact that Sinatra did not own the rights to
the song, and that the copyright owner had the right to license the
work as it desired.152
F. Right of Privacy
The right of privacy first appeared in an 1890 law review article
by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
which proposed the violation of a person's right to be left alone as a
tort. 5 3 A subsequent privacy action received short shrift in a New
York court, which held it to be the legislature's job to create this
new cause of action.' 5 4 The New York legislature quickly re-
148. See HEr JAZZ, supra note 146 (detailing "[Shaw's] highly individual tone
and lyric approach to interpretation plus a superlative technique have marked him
as one of the great jazz clarinet players of all time-possibly the greatest"); Shaw, 38
N.Y. 2d at 205 (noting that Shaw could not copyright his interpretations of other
copyrighted works).
149. See id. at 201 (describing Artie Shaw, the swing-era bandleader, could not
enjoin others from copying his "sound").
150. See Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 718 (9th Cir.
1970) (citing Sinatra's objection that commercial deceived public into believing
she was participant in commercial).
151. See id. at 716 n.12. (explaining that to untrained ear there was no readily
identifiable accent, range, quality, or pitch that would to identify it with particular
person).
152. See id. at 716 ("Had she desired to exclude all others from use of the
song so that her 'secondary meaning' with the song could not be imitated she
could have purchased those rights from the copyright proprietor.").
153. See Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv.
193, 218-19 (1890) ("The invasion of the privacy that is to be protected is equally
complete and equally injurious . . .. Viewed as a wrong to the individual, this rule
is the same pervading the whole law of torts, by which one is held responsible for
his intentional acts, even though they are committed with no sinister intent; and
viewed as a wrong to society, it is the same principle adopted in a large category of
statutory offenses.").
154. See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 545, 545 (1904)
("The legislative body could very well interfere and arbitrarily provide that no one
should be permitted for his own selfish purpose to use the picture or name of
another for advertising purposes without his consent. . . . The courts, however,
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sponded and passed privacy laws the next year.15 5 Other states ac-
cepted the new tort under common law.' 56 Privacy cases fit into
four basic categories:
(1) intrusion upon the plaintiffs physical solitude or se-
clusion, (2) public disclosure of private facts, (3) publicity
which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye,
and (4) appropriation of the plaintiffs name or likeness
for the defendant's benefit or advantage.' 5 7
The first three types of privacy cases apply mostly to the right of
private people to be left alone, focusing on the injury to human
dignity. The last frequently comes into play as the right of public
figures to control use of their names and images. This has become
known as the Right of Publicity.
G. Right of Publicity
In an early right of publicity case, Thomas Edison won an in-
junction stopping a company from using his name and image to
advertise their products.15 8 Rather than approaching the case as a
tort claim, the court treated Edison's claim as a property claim. It
held:
If a man's name be his own property, as no less an author-
ity than the United States Supreme Court says . . . it is
difficult to understand why the peculiar cast of one's fea-
tures is not also one's property, and why its pecuniary
value, if it has one, does not belong to its owner. '5 9
Taking a different approach, other early courts treated the fourth
cause of action as a privacy right that was waived when an individual
being without authority to legislate, are required to decide cases upon principle.");
see also id. (articulating that plaintiffs image was used to advertise flour without her
consent).
155. See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992) ("A person, firm or
corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the
name, portrait or picture of any living person without having first obtained the
written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or her parent or guardian, is
guilty of a misdemeanor.").
156. See Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 197 (1905) (summa-
rizing that right of privacy is derived from natural law and recognized by municipal
law).
157. WILLIAM Lioyo PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS (West Group, 5th ed. 1984) (setting forth basic privacy case categories).
158. See Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 137 (Ch. 1907)
(explaining that Mr. Edison did not want his name used as part of corporate title
or in connection with business or advertisements of the company).
159. Id. at 141.
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entered the public sphere.' 60 In O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co.,'@' Pabst
used O'Brien's picture on a calendar advertising its beer. 6 2
O'Brien, an All-American football player from Texas Christian Uni-
versity, sued, claiming that as a member of the Allied Youth of
America, "he was greatly embarrassed and humiliated" when his im-
age was used to promote alcohol.16 " The court found that O'Brien
was not a private person because he had sought various forms of
publicity and that nothing in the advertisement was "false, errone-
ous or damaging" to him. 64 The court dismissed his claim.'6 5
Federal law does not specifically cover a right of publicity. The
closest federal statute is the Lanham Act § 43(a), which allows a
litigant to block registration of a trademark that implies a false con-
nection with a person, living or dead.' 6 6 Rights of publicity are
mostly a state matter.
States vary on their provision and interpretation of rights of
publicity. Some have acknowledged it as a common law claim.'6 7
Other states have passed statutes.16  Currently, courts in Alabama,
California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Ken-
tucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin have recognized a common
law right of publicity.'16  California, Indiana, Kentucky, Nevada,
160. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 167 (5th Cir. 1941)
(noting that plaintiff, well-known and famous professional football player, had in-
tentionally posed for many pictures that were to be used for publicity-purposes,
and thus use of such pictures was not invasion of his privacy), cert. denied, 315 U.S.
823 (1941).
161. 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941).
162. See id. at 168 (explaining that Pabst included photograph of O'Brien "in
football uniform characteristically poised for the throw" directly below Pabst Blue
Ribbon label).
163. See id. at 168-69 (asserting that O'Brien was member of Allied Youth of
America that wished to do away with alcohol among young people).
164. See id. at 170 ("[M]aking and selling beer is a legitimate and eminently
respectable business and people of all walks and views in life, without injury to or
reflection upon themselves, drink it, and that any association of O'Brien's picture
with a glass of beer could not possibly disgrace or reflect upon or cause him
damage.").
165. See id. ("We think it perfectly plain that the DistrictJudge was right both
in the view he took that nothing in the publication violated plaintiffs right of
privacy and that nothing in it could be legitimately or reasonably construed as
falsely stating that he used, endorsed, or recommended the use of Pabst's beer.").
166. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (placing restriction on trademark registration for
marks implying false connection with person).
167. See RIGHTS OF PuI,icrry AND PRIVACY § 6.1 [B] (1999) [herinafter RIGHTS
OF Punucrirv] (detailing state of common law right to publicity).
168. See id (describing state legislation governing publicity rights).
169. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) (dis-
cussing state interest in allowing for right of publicity); see e.g., Allison v. Vintage
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Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington have passed statutes
specifically addressing a right of publicity.' 70 Florida, Massachu-
setts, Nebraska, New York, Rhode Island, Utah, Virginia, and Wis-
consin have statutes that focus on privacy rights and include
protection for a right of publicity. '7 The state statutes generally
require two elements. First, the plaintiff must own an enforceable
right in an identity or persona. Second, the defendant must have
used some aspect of the identity or persona, without permission, in
a way that the plaintiff is identifiable from the use and which will
likely cause damage to the persona's commercial value.
California's right of publicity was extended to an extreme in
White v. Samsung Electronics.172 There, Samsung published an ad
"depict[ing] a robot, dressed in a wig, gown, and jewelry ... se-
lected to resemble [Vanna] White's hair and dress. The robot was
posed next to a game board which is instantly recognizable as the
Wheel of Fortune game show set, in a stance for which White is
Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1447 (11th Cir. 1998) (interpreting Alabama's
"commercial appropriation privacy right" to be the equivalent of Right of Public-
ity); Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 826 n.15 (9th
Cir. 1974) (finding common law right of publicity); Bi-Rite Enters. v. Bruce Miner
Co., 757 F.2d 440, 442 (1st Cir. 1985) (explaining right of publicity); see Zim v. W.
Publ'g Co., 573 F.2d 1318, 1327 (5th Cir. 1978) (calling right privacy right);
Fergerstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean View Estates, Inc., 441 P.2d 141, 144 (Hawaii 1968)
(referring to right as privacy right); Stone v. Creative Commc'n, Inc., 216 USPQ
261, 261 (N.D. Ill. 1981) ("The fact that the plaintiff is already well-known and has
little privacy to invade does not denigrate the tort of commercial exploitation");
Cheatham v. Paisano Publ'n, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 381, 384-85 (W.D. Ky 1995) (find-
ing tort of unreasonable publicity); Carson v. Here'sJohnny Portable Toilets, Inc.,
698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 1983) (setting forth elements to right of publicity
claim); Uhlaender v. Henrickson, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1281 (D. Minn. 1970) (defin-
ing right of publicity); Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076, 1079 (Mo. App. 1911)
(finding one has exclusive right to profit from one's own picture); Palmer v.
Schonhorn Enters., 232 A.2d 458, 461 (N.J. Super. 1967) (listing privacy torts rec-
ognized by state); Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1354 (D.N.J.
1981) (stating that courts have recognized right of publicity). But see Reeves v.
United Artists Corp., 765 F.2d 79, 80 (6th Cir. 1985) (stating Ohio does not recog-
nize right to publicity claims after death); Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., 114 USPQ
314, 320 (Pa. C.P. 1957) (holding possible property right in privacy known as right
of publicity); Kimbrough v. Coca-Cola/USA, 521 S.W.2d 719, 722 (Tex. App. 1975)
(calling it "privacy"); see Nature's Way Prod., Inc. v. Nature-Pharma, Inc., 736 F.
Supp 245, 252 (D. Utah 1990) (stating common law right of publicity); Hirsch v.
S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 397 (Wis. 1979) (stating Wisconsin
common law recognizes right of publicity); RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY, supra note 167, at
6-7, 6-8 (stating tort of right of publicity).
170. See RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY, supra note 167, at 6-8 (describing states that
have statutes directly acknowledging right of publicity).
171. See id. (finding some states acknowledge right of publicity through pri-
vacy right statutes).
172. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
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famous."1 7  Vanna White sued Samsung under California Civil
Code § 3344, California's common law right of publicity, and sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act.1 7 4 The Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the dismissal of the § 3344 claim, holding that the
Samsung ad did not use White's "name, voice, signature, photo-
graph, or likeness." 17  However, that court reversed the lower
court's dismissal of White's right of publicity claim, holding that
"[i] t is not important how the defendant has appropriated the plain-
tiff's identity, but whether the defendant has done so."176 It also re-
instated White's Lanham Act claim that Samsung used "a false
description or representation" of her.'7 7 For a Lanham Act claim
to survive, White had to show a "likelihood of confusion . . . over
whether White was endorsing Samsung's VCRs."' 7 * After following
the established eight-factor test for confusion, the court held that
White had raised "a genuine issue of material fact concerning a
likelihood of confusion as to her endorsement." '7
III. APPLYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION TO THE
SPECIAL NEEDS OF VARIETY PERFORMERS
Most variety artists make their living from live performances,
rather than appearing on television or selling recordings of their
shows. Therefore, variety artists tend to be more interested in pro-
tecting their acts and material from other performers than in ex-
ploiting recordings of their performances, although there is a
significant business in creating instructional books and videos for
use within the arts and those who create such works have an interest
in protecting their books and videos from unauthorized copying.
173. See id. at 1396 (stating factual background surrounding plaintiffs alleged
copyright infringement). Samsung called the advertisement the "Vanna White"
ad. See id. (noting that White did not give consent or get paid for ad).
174. See id. (listing cause of action). Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). See id. at 1397 (noting where Lanham Act is codified).
175. See id. at 1397 (explaining that robot used to depict Vanna White had
mechanical features dissimilar from White's precise features and thus did not
amount to her likeness as defined by § 3344).
176. Id. at 1397-98 (emphasis added).
177. See id. at 1400-01 (citing 15 U.S.C. 1125(a)) (stating that White's claim
was improperly dismissed at summary judgment stage in light of likelihood of con-
fusion assessment required to prevail on claim brought pursuant to Lanham Act).
178. Id. at 1399-1400 (citation omitted).
179. Id. at 1401. The eight factors are: "(1) strength of plaintiffs mark; (2)
relatedness of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confiu-
sion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) likely degree of purchaser care; (7) defen-
dant's intent in selecting the mark; (8) likelihood of expansion of the product
lines." Id. (citing AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir.
1979)).
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There is no single clear cause of action that protects a variety per-
former's rights to his or her act. This section will consider various
elements of a variety act and discuss the claims an artist could bring
against a copying performer. Since the author is a magician, many
examples will be drawn from that art, but the issues and law will
apply throughout the variety arts.
A. Protecting a Stage Name or Act Title
A name or a title can not only embody an artist's persona, but
also provide a way for the audience members to remember whose
performance they saw, and for prospective employers to recall
whom they want to hire. Trademark claims have been used to pro-
tect stage names and act titles when there are close copies. Charlie
Chaplin successfully sued Charles Amador and prevented Amador
from performing as "Charles Aplin," dressing like and using the sig-
nature mannerisms of Chaplin's "Little Tramp" character.',,' That
court defined Chaplin's character by describing his costume, rather
than his personality or other qualities."' Amador was not only en-
joined from using the name "Charlie Aplin," he was forbidden from
using a costume similar to Chaplin's character's costume. 182 The
Chaplin court noted: "it is plaintiffs right to be protected against
those who would injure him by fraudulent means; that is, by coun-
terfeiting his role-or, in other words, plaintiff has the right to be
protected against 'unfair competition in business."' " 3
In the late 1930s and into the 1940s, Charles Hoffman per-
formed in vaudeville theaters with his "Any-Drink-Called-For" magic
act as "Think-a-Drink Hoffman."' 84 Hoffman opened his act with a
short speech, and then invited his audience to think of any drink
180. See Chaplin v. Amador, 269 P. 544, 544-45 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1928)
(presenting finding of lower court on appeal).
181. See id. at 545 (explaining Chaplin's costume). The court stated:
Chaplin has generally worn a kind of attire peculiar and individual to
himself, consisting of a particular kind or type of mustache, old and
threadbare hat, clothes and shoes, a decrepit derby, ill-fitting vest, tight-
fitting coat, and trousers and shoes much too large for him, and with this
attire, a flexible cane usually carried, swung and bent as he performs his
part. This character, and the manner of dress, has been used and por-
trayed by Charles Chaplin for so long and with such artistry, that he has
become well known all over the world in this character.
Id.
182. See id. (affirming decision reached by trial court).
183. Id. at 546.
184. See Glazer v. Hoffman, 16 So. 2d 53, 53-54 (Fla. 1943) (introducing plain-
tiff's magic act and copyright infringement claim against defendant).
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they might desire.'35 As members of the audience thought of bev-
erages, Hoffman poured beakers of water into cocktail shakers and
finally poured out each specialty drink.186 Hoffman's act was an
improvement on an act by a Swiss magician performing as De Roze,
who had his audiences name aloud the drinks they wanted.18 7
Neither of the performers had created the "Any-Drink-Called-For"
act, and they were not the only ones performing it."s' In 1943,
Hoffman sued a competing magician named Maurice Glazer for al-
legedly copying Hoffman's act.189 Glazer performed effectively the
same act, giving a short speech - sometimes even the same speech
as Hoffman's - and then pouring requested drinks. It was not re-
corded whether Glazer's audiences had to announce their requests,
or if he fulfilled silent requests as well.' 90 Glazer even took a similar
stage name, using "Think-a-Drink Count Maurice" and "Have-a-
Drink Count Maurice.i 9 The court granted Hoffman an injunc-
tion preventing Glazer from using the "Think-a-Drink" trade name
and from delivering Hoffman's copyrighted speech before perform-
ing the act.19 2 However, the court also held that Hoffman was not
entitled to copyright protection on the rest of his act.' 9 3 Thus,
Glazer could continue to perform "Any-Drink-Called-For." 9 4
A more recent, and less successful, suit involved the series of
specials called "Breaking the Magician's Code: Magic's Biggest
Secrets Finally Revealed," which aired on the Fox network starting
185. See id. at 54 (describing parts of overall performance).
186. See id. (explaining details of act).
187. SeeMILBOURNE CHRISTOPHER & MAURINE CHRISTOPHER, ILLUSTRATEi) His-
TORY OF MAGIC 292 (2006) (citing differences among performers' shows and tech-
niques). The Glazercourt did not note the performance's origin. See Glazer, 16 So.
2d at 54 (reciting facts of case).
188. See Glazer, 16 So. 2d at 54 (describing act's characteristics as common to
sleight-of-hand magic acts).
189. See id. at 53 (listing elements of copyright infringement claim).
190. See id. at 54 (explaining elements of Glazer's performance).
191. See id. (comparing plaintiffs and defendant's trade names).
192. See id. at 56 (affirming lower court's injunction regarding pre-perform-
ance "patter" and use of trade name).
193. See id. (reversing remaining aspects of prior holding).
194. See id. (limiting injunction to "patter" and trade name). This case oc-
curred before the "choreography" and "pantomime" sections were added to the
Copyright Act. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (highlighting when
"choreography" and "pantomime" were added to Copyright Act). With the protec-
tion of those sections, the silent portion of the act might have received copyright
protection, if it met the required standards. See supra notes 61-72 and accompany-
ing text (clarifying Copyright Act's protections for dramatic works, choreography,
and pantomimes).
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in November 1997.'"1 Robert Rice, owner of a 1986 video, "Mystery
Magician-He Dares To Expose the Secrets Behind Magic's Most
Mystifying Illusions," sued Fox, claiming he had a common law
trademark in the title "Mystery Magician," and that Fox violated his
trademark. 9 6 Rice had not registered "Mystery Magician" as a
trademark, so he first had to prove the mark was sufficiently distinc-
tive.19 7 The court held that his mark was descriptive at best, requir-
ing him to produce evidence of secondary meaning to receive
protection.'19 Rice did "no customer surveys," and the evidence
showed that advertising for his video had been "extremely lim-
ited."'I" Therefore, the court found that Rice had no mark worthy
of protection in the term "Mystery Magician," and dismissed his
trademark claim. The court used the same rationale to dismiss
Rice's Lanham Act claim that "Mystery Magician" was protected
from "false representations concerning the origin, association, or
endorsement of goods or services through the wrongful use of an-
other's distinctive mark .... ."2o
B. Protecting a Character
A variety artist may spend years creating, developing, and per-
forming as a particular character. That character may be as distinc-
tive as Charlie Chaplin's tramp character, but many are not.21" The
majority of variety and novelty acts tend to focus on the feats that
make the act remarkable, rather than developing a substantial or
nuanced character. Although a clown, for example, may want to
195. See Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1037-38 (C.D. Cal.
2001) (describing production and broadcast of television specials).
196. See id. at 1047 (discussing basis for plaintiffs common law trademark
claim). Rice made a variety of claims, including a trademark claim for the masked
magician character, and a copyright claim for the show as a whole. See id. (noting
different types of claims Rice made). Each claim will be discussed separately as
protection for those elements are covered in the proceeding sections. See infra
notes 286-351 and accompanying text (discussing elements of trademark and copy-
right claims).
197. See id. at 1064 (recounting case law standard for proving distinctive
trademark).
198. See id. at 1064-65 (detailing process to establish "secondary meaning"
once plaintiffs argument fails to prove trademark is sufficiently distinctive).
199. See id. at 1065 (evaluating public impression of disputed trademark that
it lacked "secondary meaning").
200. See id. at 1062-64 (citation omitted) (finding no substantial similarity be-
tween his video and Television Specials). Id. at 1063 (stating Rice was unable to
claim that his work was real inspiration for Television Specials because they
"[were] not substantially similar to his [Rice's] copyrighted work.").
201. SeeJovcE MILTON, TIAM,: THE LIFE OF CHARLIE CHAPLIN 61 (1996) (dis-
cussing his character's distinctive features which made Chaplin "instantly
recognizable").
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protect the costume and quirks which make his character different
from other clowns, he is unlikely to receive copyright protection, as
illustrated by the examples below.
1. Copyright
Character copyrights have been granted for characters such as
Godzilla, James Bond, Superman, and Rocky Balboa, as well as
Mickey Mouse, Minnie Mouse, Donald Duck, and Goofy. 202 All
these characters were protected because they "transcend the
boundaries of any one copyrighted work."203 In order to protect a
character, the character must be "'the story'," or at least be "fleshed
out" enough to deserve protection separate from the surrounding
work.204 Frequently, these characters have appeared in various me-
dia forms and in a number of separate works, with their personali-
ties and attributes consistent from work to work so that they are
distinct from other characters.20 5 For example, the characterJames
Bond is still recognizable as "a unique character [with] specific
qualities," even though a number of actors have played the role. 206
Courts also consider how much appeal the plot of the piece holds
compared to how much draw the character itself has, positing that
"audiences do not watch Tarzan, Superman, Sherlock Holmes, or
James Bond for the story, they watch these films to see their heroes
at work."'^7 For example, the standard for providing copyright pro-
tection to characters is so high that detective Sam Spade from "The
Maltese Falcon" was not deemed worthy. 208
202. See Rice, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 1055 (citing Toho Co., Ltd. v. William Mor-
row & Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1215 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.
v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Warner Bros.,
Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., 720 F.2d 231, 24045 (2d Cir. 1983); Anderson v. Stallone,
No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989); Walt Dis-
ney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1978)) (listing cases protect-
ing specific characters based on copyright protection which attached apart from
character's depiction in separate copyrighted work).
03. See Rice, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 1055 (observing that characters were pro-
tected because they were developed in more than single productions).
204. See id. at 1055-56 (citation omitted) (describing two ways to copyright
characters apart from copyrighted work itself).
205. See id. at 1056 (acknowledging "significant development" for characters
necessary to make them copyrightable).
206. See Metro-Goldwryn-Mayer, 900 F. Supp. at 1296 (describing consistency re-
quirement that protectable characters have constant specific qualities despite dif-
fering storylines).
207. See Rice, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 1056 (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 900 F.
Supp. at 1296) (emphasizing importance of main character in works).
208. See Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 216 F.2d
945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954) (denying copyright protection for character).
101
29
Crasson: The Limited Protections of Intellectual Property Law for the Vari
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012
102 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
Robert Rice argued that his "mystery magician" character in
Rice v. Fox Broadcasting Company was copyrightable apart from its ap-
pearance in the video.209 He claimed:
The plot, setting, sequence of events, dialogue (or mono-
logue), mood, tone and pace are all directly driven from
the persona of the Masked Magician, a character accurately
described ... as a magician anti-hero who embarks upon a
simple, direct approach to the age-old 'no-no' of telling
tales out of school by revealing highly secret magic illu-
sions to the public. 2 111
To the contrary, the court found the "Masked Magician" to be
most remarkable for the lack of any specific traits, noting that the
character was presented in a way that removed practically all ele-
ments of unique identity.2 "' The court considered the character
more of an archetype of a magician than an actual character, "little
more than an undifferentiated cipher .. 212
The court also applied the merger and "scenes d faire" doctrines
and reduced the level of available protection for Rice's Mystery Ma-
gician character. It found that there are only so many "ways to ex-
press the 'idea' of a magician revealing the secrets of tricks/
illusions while being disguised to protect his identity," and that the
expressions of the characters in both Rice's video and the Fox spe-
cials merge with that idea.213 The court further noted that, "in the
genre of 'revealing magic tricks,"' a masked magician was a "scene d
faire," and because Rice's copyright in his Mystery Magician was
therefore "'thin,"' it could only be violated if the "allegedly infring-
ing character [was] nearly identical." 2t14 The court then pointed to
various distinctions between the two characters and denied
relief.215
209. Rice, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 1055-58 (arguing "Mystery Magician" character
alone was enough for viable copyright infringement claim, and stating court's
counter-argument to claim).
210. Id. at 1055 (citation omitted).
211. See id. at 1056 (determining character's anonymity, lack of character de-
velopment, and ability to be replaced).
212. See id. at 1057 (concluding character was without identity and more nota-
ble for its lack of depiction).
213. See id. (describing Masked Magician's representation of classic magicians
or illusionists, rather than unique character portrayal).
214. See id. at 1057-58 (declaring no reasonable juror would find Rice's char-
acter to meet that standard).
215. See id. (determining characters were not "substantially similar . . .
[under] matter of law").
[Vol. 19: p. 73
30
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol19/iss1/3
2012] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW FOR THE VARIETY ARTS
2. Right of Publicity
If a performer's actual image or voice is used, the artist may
have a right of publicity claim. If the performer is sufficiently fa-
mous and distinctive, protection may extend beyond the per-
former's actual image to prohibit any representation that is
identifiable as that performer. As discussed above, rights of public-
ity vary from state to state.2 16
The Supreme Court recognized the right of publicity in
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Company, a 1977 case involv-
ing a novelty act.2 17 Hugo Zacchini was a "human cannonball."2 18
In his act, he climbed into a cannon that then shot him two hun-
dred feet through the air into a net.219 He claimed his father had
created the act, and that only his family had performed it for the
last fifty years. 220 A reporter brought a movie camera to Zacchini's
show at the Geauga County Fair in Burton, Ohio, and filmed the
fifteen second segment climax of Zacchini's act.221 The tape was
broadcast on the 11 o'clock evening news. 222  Zacchini sued
Scripps-Howard, the operator of the television station, claiming that
the station's actions were an "unlawful appropriation of plaintiffs
professional property."2 2" The trial court granted Scripps-Howard
summary judgment.224 The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed, hold-
ing Zacchini had stated a copyright claim, with one judge noting in
his concurrence that Zacchini had a claim under the right of pub-
licity.225 The Supreme Court of Ohio followed the concurring
216. See supra notes 167-171 and accompanying text (acknowledging states'
varying positions on right of publicity laws).
217. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 563 (1977) (ac-
knowledging that in August and September 1972 this novelty act was performed on
regular basis at Geauga County Fair and audience not charged separate admission
to watch act).
218. See id. at 563 (explaining "Zacchini performed his fifteen second act in
fenced space within fair grounds").
219. See id. (describing details of act).
220. See id. at 564 (detailing Zacchini claim that he was "engaged in the en-
tertainment business").
221. See id. at 563-64 (noting that Zacchini had seen movie camera previously
and had asked reporter not to film his performance).
222. See id. at 564 (reciting facts of incident leading to claim).
223. See id. (citing Brief for Petitioner at *3, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (No. 76-577), 1977 WL 189127 at *3) (recounting
that Zacchini claimed news station "showed and commercialized the film of his act
without his consent").
224. See id. (holding against plaintiff).
225. See id. (stating decision of court of appeals). The Ohio appellate court
found that "entertainment, in the sense of a total performance, does not fall within
any reasonable definition of newsworthiness warranting the use of the First
Amendment to allow its total appropriation by a news medium." Zacchini v.
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judge and held Zacchini's claim was based on a property right in
the "publicity value of his performance."2 2"
The United States Supreme Court found the purpose of
Ohio's right of publicity to be providing an individual "the ight ...
to reap the reward of his endeavors . . . ."227 Like copyrights and
patents, the right of publicity "provides an economic incentive for
[the performer] to make the investment required to produce a per-
formance of interest to the public."228 The Supreme Court be-
lieved that, as a professional performer, Zacchini would provide the
public the benefit of his performances "as long as his commercial
stake in his act is appropriately recognized." 229 The Court noted
that broadcasting an entire show "goes to the heart of petitioner's
ability to earn a living as an entertainer," and that the strongest case
for a violation of the right of publicity is not using a performer's
image or reputation, "but the appropriation of the very activity by
which the entertainer acquired his reputation in the first place." 230
The case was then remanded to the Ohio Supreme Court, which
subsequently remanded the case for trial regarding the issue of in-
fringement, and possibly damages. 23 1
Since Zacchini, other cases, notably White v. Samsung Electronics,
have expanded the right of publicity. 232 This expansion may allow
Scripps-Howard Broad. Co.. No. 33713, 1975 WL 182619, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App.July
10, 1975) (reversing summary judgment in favor of defendant).
226. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 562 (noting that Ohio Supreme Court ruled in
favor of broadcasting company on grounds that "it was constitutionally privileged
to include in its newscasts matters of public interest that would otherwise would be
protected by the right of publicity, absent an intent to injure or to appropriate for
some nonprivileged purpose").
227. See id. at 573-74 (referring to fact that Zacchini "did not seek to enjoin
the broadcast of his act; he simply sought compensation for the broadcast in the
form of damages").
228. See id. at 576 ("[The economic philosophy behind the clause empower-
ing Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts."') (quot-
ing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)).
229. See id. at 578 (asserting that Zacchini simply wanted to be paid for broad-
cast of his performance as opposed to seeking to enjoin broadcast of his perform-
ance altogether).
230. See id. at 576 (explaining that protection provides economic incentive for
Zacchini to make investment required to produce performance of interest to
public).
231. See generally id. at 583 (remanding to Ohio Supreme Court).
232. See supra notes 172-179 and accompanying text (explaining court's rea-
soning on right of publicity); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395,
1398 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing "the common law right of publicity reaches
means of appropriation other than name or likeness . . . [and] does not require
that appropriations of identity be accomplished through particular means . . . .").
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variety artists to protect themselves against imitators if the artist is
sufficiently famous and if the imitator used indicia of the per-
former's character. An imitator's use of the same costume ele-
ments coupled with the performance of the same feats could
provide a basis for one performer to claim the imitator violated his
or her right of publicity. However, this argument is unlikely to suc-
ceed. The White expansion of the right of publicity has not been
adopted by the other federal circuit courts, nor has it been tested
further within the Ninth Circuit.233 In most jurisdictions, the right
of publicity does not extend nearly as far.234 Additionally, few vari-
ety artists have approached Vanna White's level of celebrity or noto-
riety, so it is unlikely many would receive her level of protection.235
C. Protecting a Device or Element
Variety performers often use special equipment in their per-
formances, and many innovative performers adapt their equipment
or invent new devices. A juggler creates a specially weighted and
balanced knife to juggle. A ventriloquist fits out a dummy with eye-
brows that wiggle to make it more expressive. A magician designs a
box to restrain an assistant while the magician slices the assistant
into tiny pieces and puts the assistant back together. Just like any
other device, these inventions may qualify for intellectual property
protection. It is impractical, however, for many variety artists to
take advantage of these protections.
1. Trade Secret Protection
When one thinks of magicians protecting the secrets of their
art, the first thing to come to mind is trade secret protection. 236 A
233. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 938 (6th Cir. 2003)
(denying expansion of right of publicity); see also Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League
Baseball Players Assoc., 95 F.3d 959, 962 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding First Amend-
ment right to free expression outweighs MLB's right of publicity). The Ninth Cir-
cuit denied an en banc hearing in White, a decision in which several judges
dissented. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1512 (9th Cir.
1993) (denying petition for rehearing).
234. See White, 989 F.2d at 1512 (denying petition for rehearing). For a fur-
ther discussion of right of publicity, see supra notes 158-176 and accompanying
text.
235. See White, 971 F.2d at 1398 (expanding right of publicity). At the time of
the action, approximately forty million people watched Vanna White on Wheel of
Fortune each day. See id. at 1396 (describing popularity of Wheel of Fortune by
reference to daily viewership).
236. See Harrison v. SF Broad., 1998 WL 355462 at *3 (E.D. La. 1998) (noting
plaintiffs described themselves as "class members who hold common 'trade secrets'
that are shared in the 'common domain of magicians, illusion builders and magic
dealers.'") (quoting Pl.'s Pet. and Application for Class Certification, filed in Civil
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trade secret is secret information that gives the owner a competitive
advantage. 237 Trade secret protection is impractical and almost im-
possible for variety artists to maintain because the protection is so
easy to lose. The owner of a trade secret must take precautions to
prevent others from learning the secret in order to avoid losing the
protection.2 38 Variety artists frequently move from venue to venue
and only rarely have any control over who has backstage access.
They usually lack the power to make everyone they work with sign
non-disclosure agreements.2 " As a result, it is often very difficult
for such artists to implement protections that a court would con-
sider reasonable precautions to maintain secrecy.
Even if a performer could satisfy the requirements necessary to
obtain trade secret status for their acts, protection probably would
not last long. Variety artists use their trade secrets, or devices em-
bodying those secrets, in plain sight, onstage, and in front of an
audience. Anyone who buys a ticket can get a good look. Competi-
tors could watch the secret in use and then legitimately reverse en-
gineer the invention and use it for themselves. 240
For example, in the late 1870s, a magician named Buatier
deKolta was popular for performing a flower production, his own
invention. 241 In the course of his show, he took a single large sheet
of paper, twisted it into a cone, and shook it, sending tissue-paper
flowers spilling out over the stage as the cone overflowed. 242 Dur-
ing one performance, a draft whisked some of the flowers off the
District Court for the Parish of Orleans). The plaintiffs were suing over Fox Broad-
casting's television specials, "Breaking the Magicians' Code," (the same ones at
issue in Rice v. Fox Broadcasting, discussed infra notes 289-321 and accompanying
text) for revealing "trade secrets" belonging to the class of Plaintiffs. See Harrison,
1998 WL 355462 at *1 (presenting plaintiffs' claim of misappropriation of trade
secrets).
237. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 15 (discussing trade secret law). For addi-
tional explanation of trade secret characteristics, see supra notes 15-22 and accom-
panying text.
238. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4)(ii) (1985) (providing definition of
"trade secret"). For a further discussion of trade secrets, see supra notes 15-22 and
accompanying text.
239. But see Don Butler, Copperfield Prefers Tears to Gasps, CANADA.COM (March
4, 2006), http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/arts/story.html?id=2d8839
ba-45fb-4352-aOOa-dd36af60c318&k=17073 (discussing that all of Copperfield's em-
ployees sign NDAs).
240. See UTSA §1(1) (stating reverse engineering as legitimate means for us-
ing trade secret). For a further discussion of trade secret protection, see supra
notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
241. See JIM STEINMEYER, HIDING THE ELEPHANT: HOW MAGICIANS INVENTED
THE IMPOSSIBLE ANi) LEARNED TO DISAPPEAR 161 (Carroll & Graf, 2003) (describing
deKolta's flower trick).
242. See id. (describing deKolta's flower trick).
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stage.2 4 3 A magician watching the show grabbed a flower and
dashed out of the theater.244 Shortly thereafter, and ever since,
deKolta's specially designed paper flowers could be purchased
cheaply at any magic shop.2 45 The exposure of deKolta's flowers
was accidental, caused by a stray breeze, and a competitor took ad-
vantage of the opportunity.
Harry Kellar was the preeminent magician in America in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 246 He constantly
needed new illusions to add to his show so he could offer his audi-
ences something new and amazing during each tour.24 7 In addition
to purchasing the inventions of other magicians, Kellar traveled to
London each year to study the latest creations of John Nevil Mas-
kelyne, the greatest illusion inventor of that time.248 In 1901, Mas-
kelyne's showpiece was "The Entranced Fakir," an impossible
levitation that utterly baffled even the magicians who saw it.249
None of the methods of levitation known to the craft could explain
what happened in this illusion.250 It seemed to be the the perfect
illusion, and Kellar had to have it.25I In an attempt to learn the
secret, Kellar and his mechanic attended several performances, sit-
ting in different sections of the theater and even bringing opera
glasses to get a close-up view, but they learned nothing.25 2 Finally,
Kellar bought a front-row ticket.253 In the middle of Maskelyne's
performance, just as his assistant's body rose toward the ceiling, Kel-
lar got up, climbed the stairs to the stage, got a good look at Mas-
kelyne's apparatus, and left.254
Under modern trade secret law, Kellar probably could have
used knowledge obtained this way to legally reverse engineer Mas-
243. See id. (describing one particular performance of flower trick).
244. See id. at 161-62 (describing one particular performance of flower trick).
245. See id. at 162 (describing implications of accidental revealing of flower
trick).
246. See MILBOURNE CHRISTOPHER, THE ILLUSTRATED HisTORY OF MAGIC 219
(Running Press Book Publishers, 2005) (describing Kellar's profitable tours of Cal-
ifornia and Mexico). Kellar was probably the inspiration for the title character in
L. Frank Baum's "The Wizard of Oz." See STEINMEYER, supra note 241, at 167 (not-
ing Kellar was leading magician at time of Baum's book).
247. See STEINMEYER, supra note 241, at 169 (detailing Kellar's search for new
tricks).
248. See id. (detailing Kellar's search for new tricks).
249. See id. (describing Maskelyne's new levitation trick).
250. See id. (discussing different methods of levitation).
251. See id. at 170 (noting illusion's genius).
252. See id. at 169 (discussing methods used to discover illusion).
253. See id. (detailing Kellar's attempts to ascertain Maskelyne's method).
254. See id. (discussing Kellar's actions).
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kelyne's levitation. As it turned out, Kellar's brazen venture onto
Maskelyne's stage was futile. He did not learn enough to reverse
engineer the levitation. 255 Determined to learn the secret, Kellar
paid Paul Valadon, another magician performing at Maskelyne's
theater, to provide rough sketches of the apparatus. 25 6 In 1904,
Kellar finally introduced his version of the Maskelyne levitation in
the United States. 257 Howard Thurston, Kellar's successor, subse-
quently performed the Maskelyne levitation in the United States for
many years.258 In Thurston's presentation, he actually invited
members of the audience up on stage.259 He knew the volunteers
would see part of the mechanism, but believed their presence
would make the illusion even stronger for the hundreds in the gal-
lery.260 The levitation eventually, and ironically, also appeared in
the show of another magician who had hired Thurston's old back-
stage assistants.261 This miraculous illusion could not have been
protected as a trade secret. The nature of a magic show prevented
it.
2. Patent Protection
The Maskelyne levitation could most likely have been pro-
tected by a patent because it fit the basic requirements.262 It was a
novel, useful, certainly non-obvious device, and had Maskelyne de-
scribed it sufficiently and submitted a patent application, he proba-
bly would have been granted a patent. Patents would be a perfectly
acceptable method for some variety artists to protect their inven-
tions, when secrecy regarding the' mechanism is not required.
However, magicians rarely patent their inventions. The reason for
this omission is illustrated by the story of Horace Goldin.
Goldin, the man who popularized "Sawing a Woman in Half'
in the United States in the 1920's, patented the "Illusion Device" he
255. See id. at 169-70 (detailing illusion's intricacy).
256. See id. at 170 (recounting arrangement between Kellar and Valadon).
257. See id. at 174 (discussing Kellar's act).
258. See id. at 210 (noting Thurston's succession).
259. See id. at 209 (recounting Thurston's illusion).
260. See id. at 210 (discussing benefits and disadvantages of audience
participation).
261. See id. at 211 (recounting assistant's later use of illusion). The record did
not support that a non-disclosure agreement or contractual clause existed, which
had there been, might have resulted in Thurston having a cause of action. Id.
262. For a further discussion of qualifications for obtaining a patent, see supra
notes 23-33 and accompanying text.
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used for his "Sawing."263 Goldin's patent is available to the public,
and was available as soon as it was awarded, while he was still per-
forming the "Sawing."264 Anyone who wanted to find out how Gol-
din achieved his feat just had to ask the Patent Office, which is
antithetical to the secrecy required for an effective magic show.
One court noted that the value of a magic show "depends upon the
degree of mystery in which the performer is able to envelop the
means which he uses to accomplish the end."265
Goldin's patent worked against him when he sued the R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Company.266 R.J. Reynolds used an advertising
campaign for Camel Cigarettes called "It's Fun To Be Fooled ...
It's More Fun To Know."2 6 7 The campaign was a series of comic
strips showing magicians performing various illusions, and then ex-
posing them.268 Goldin sued over the strip illustrating "Sawing a
Woman in Half."269 The court held Goldin did not have an action-
able unfair competition claim since the advertisement "did not re-
veal to the public any thing or any fact of which the public was not
already deemed to have knowledge" and that he had "abandoned
his secret to the public" when he obtained his patent.270
Some variety artists use design patents to protect their cre-
ations. Design patents allow the patent holders to prevent others
from copying decorative, non-functional elements of a device, and
prevent confusion between an original prop and an imitation.27'
While this would serve an artist's need not to reveal a device's secret
workings, the protection is limited, as the design patent does not
263. U.S. Patent No. 1,458,575 (filed Sept. 9, 1921) available at http://pat
imgl.uspto.gov/.piw?docid=01458575&SectionNum=1&IDKey=I 13D9FF536BD&
HomeUrl=http://pimg-piw.uspto.gov.
264. See UNITED STATES PATENT AN) TRADEMARK OFFICE, WWW.uspto.gov (last
visited Nov. 2, 2011 ) (showing description and schematic of device).
265. Goldin v. Clarion Photoplays, Inc., 195 N.Y.S. 455, 456 (1st Dept. 1922).
266. See Goldin v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 22 F. Supp. 61, 65 (S.D.N.Y.
1938) (discussing why Goldin's patent ended up working against him).
267. See id. at 63 (describing advertising campaign).
268. See id. (explaining how it was "more fun to know" the secrets behind the
illusions, and that Camel Cigarettes were made of tobacco superior to other
brands). The comic strips are in the possession of Mike Caveney of Pasadena, CA.
Id.
269. See id. at 62 (introducing Goldin's suit against Camel).
270. Id. at 65.
271. See Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 531 (1871) (discussing design
patents).
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apply to necessary, functional elements, which could then be cop-
ied without infringing.272
3. Vaious State Laws
Another option for performers seeking to protect their acts is
to look to miscellaneous state laws. Horace Goldin managed to pre-
vent Clarion Photoplays from showing a movie that exposed the
workings of his patented "Sawing a Woman in Half' by bringing an
unfair competition action. 2 7 3 Goldin proved, to the satisfaction of
the court, that: he created the illusion; the illusion was distinct from
prior mutilation or decapitation illusions; he was well known for
performing it; and he would lose his booking there if the movie
were to be shown in a town.274 The court granted the requested
injunction, noting "the conclusion cannot be escaped that the pur-
pose of the defendants in the making and exhibition of their pic-
ture is to unlawfully and unfairly take advantage of the success
which has rewarded the plaintiff's initiative and to deprive him of
the fruits of his ingenuity, expense, and labor."2 75
Another case invoked an even more rarely used cause of ac-
tion. The same Fox magic exposure special that inspired the Rice
lawsuit also engendered the ire of Joseph F. Harrison, who sued
Fox under the Louisiana Abuse of Rights doctrine. 276 In 1998, Har-
rison represented a group of "magicians, illusion builders and
magic dealers" suing Fox Broadcasting. 277 In the "Petition and Ap-
plication for Class Certification," the plaintiffs alleged they were
class members who held common "trade secrets" that were shared
in the "common domain of magicians, illusion builders and magic
dealers," and that the defendants knew publishing the "trade
secrets" could do damage to the class of plaintiffs, and yet they still
published the information "deliberately, brutally, wantonly, and
272. See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 680 (Fed. Cir. R.
2008) (discussing how trial court has job of "distinguishing between those features
of the claimed design that are ornamental and those that are purely functional").
273. See Goldin v. Clarion Photoplays, 195 N.Y.S. 455, 456, 460 (1st Dept
1922) (holding "the defendants have simply sought unfairly and unjustly to profit
by plaintiffs success, by adopting the name which he gave to his illusion, and by
copying his methods in an unfair competition and unreasonable interference with
plaintiffs rights, which the courts should and will prevent").
274. See id. at 456 (discussing necessary elements that Goldin met).
275. See id. (stating holding of court).
276. See Harrison v. SF Broad., CIV. A. 98-1107, 1998 WL 355462 (E.D. La.
Jun. 30, 1998) (discussing Harrison's suit against Fox).
277. See id. at *1 (introducing parties to suit).
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willfully." 278 The misuse of the legal term "trade secrets" when Har-
rison meant that the information revealed were secrets of the magi-
cians' trade, almost led the court to believe Harrison was relying on
Louisiana's Uniform Trade Secrets Act, which all involved agreed
was inapplicable. 279 Unfortunately for Harrison, the Louisiana
Abuse of Rights doctrine was no more help to him. The doctrine is
usually used in contract or property cases, and the plaintiff may
have a remedy if:
(1) rights were exercised for the exclusive or predominant
purpose of harming another; (2) rights were exercised in
the absence of a serious and legitimate interest that is wor-
thy of judicial protection; (3) rights were used in violation
of moral rules, good faith, or elementary fairness; or (4)
rights were exercised for a purpose other than that for
which they were granted. 28 0
Harrison's case was dismissed for failure to state a claim for
which relief could be granted because no contractual or property
rights were abused.28 1 The court acknowledged the frustration of
the magicians, recognizing that the suit "seeks to redress the be-
trayal of the honor code among magicians, but such redress is not
available here because no legal rights have been violated."28 2
D. Protecting Choreography
1. Special Elements of the Act
a. Secret Elements
Some variety acts work because of special choreography that is
not seen or appreciated by the audience, such as the secret maneu-
vering that allows a magician's assistant to appear in the box that
previously held a tiger. While choreography can be protected
under copyright law, its usefulness to variety artists is very limited.
To gain copyright protection, the choreography must be fixed in a
278. See id. at *3 (quoting Plaintiffs Petition and Application for Class Certifi-
cation, SF Broadcasting, CIV. A. 98-1107, 1998 WL 355462 (E.D. La. Jun. 30,
1998)).
279. See Harrison, 1998 WL 355462, at *34 (describing Harrison's near dis-
qualification by using improper term).
280. Id. at *4 (citing Deus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 506, 520 (5th Cir.1994),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1014).
281. See id. at *4 (stating reason why case was dismissed).
282. See id. (emphasis added) (showing court's understanding of challenges
of magicians).
III
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tangible medium. 2s3 The performer could make a recording of the
performance from an angle that would reveal the secret move, or
the details could be fixed in some other medium, like a written
description. However, the more successful a magician is in keeping
the special choreography a secret from the audience, the more dif-
ficult it will be to prove that the imitator copied the material. If the
imitating performer never had access to the secret choreography,
infringement will be challenging to prove.
Another difficulty is that many illusions can usually be accom-
plished in a variety of ways, and gaining exclusive rights for one
method does not provide protection for the illusion if performed in
a different manner. Accordingly, the benefit from copyrighting the
secret choreography is limited. Also, if there was only one way to
create the illusion, the concept of merger, which provides that pro-
tection will not be granted for expressions of ideas when the expres-
sion is the only way to express the idea, would likely prevent
copyright protection for secret moves, since actions required to exe-
cute an idea will merge with -the idea.284 For example, just like the
basic instructions in a recipe cannot be protected by copyright, the
movements necessary to maneuver an ace to the top of the deck
would not be protected.
Trade Secret protection is also unlikely to give the variety artist
much protection for clandestine choreography for the same practi-
cal reasons it does not grant much protection to mechanisms - the
means for creating the illusions are too easily reverse engineered by
other practitioners, the usual performance conditions make it too
easy for others to gain access to the secret choreography, and it is
too difficult to enforce the secrecy needed to maintain the
protection.285
b. Featured Elements
Some variety performers feature unique choreography in their
acts, which make their acts different and more dangerous or more
exciting, exhilarating, and electrifying than their competition. A
283. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1990) (providing subject matter requirements for
original works to be eligible for copyright protection under federal statute).
284. See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d. 675, 678-79 (1st Cir.
1967) (holding that copyright cannot extend to expression where there were only
limited number of possibilities); see also Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977) (detailing requirements
for expressions with respect to merger doctrine); supra notes 73-81 and accompa-
nying text (detailing application of merger doctrine in court).
285. For a further discussion on trade secrets, see supra notes 236-261 and
accompanying text.
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trapeze artist may be the first to perform a quadruple flip when the
competition is doing triples. When a variety artist performs for the
same audience over and over, they must provide a new feat to draw
a crowd, and when a performer looks for work, they must have
something to distinguish them from their rivals. These elements
also will most likely not be protected under current United States
intellectual property laws. The idea of the feat cannot be pro-
tected, and the expression or execution of a quadruple flip, for ex-
ample, would merge with the idea.
2. The Act as a Whole
a. Copyright
Copyrighting an act as a whole is possible by fixing it in a tangi-
ble medium, either by writing down the script and choreography or
by videotaping a performance.2 8 6 While these precautions will
grant the variety artist all of the rights available from copyright laws,
the value of that protection is limited. In order to enforce the copy-
rights, artists would have to prove, among other things, that there
was substantial similarity between their acts and the allegedly in-
fringing performances.2 87 Unless an act was copied in its entirety,
this is a difficult claim to prove. The case against Fox Broadcasting
for its magic exposure specials, mentioned above, was one of the
few such cases to result in a published opinion. In 1997, Fox aired
the first of a series of specials called "Breaking the Magicians'
Code" (the "Special"). The Special featured an anonymous
"Masked Magician" who performed and exposed several illu-
sions.28 8 Rice sued Fox Broadcasting for allegedly imitating a video
Rice had made in 1985-86, which featured a masked magician per-
forming and exposing several illusions (the "Video").289 Rice sued
Fox and asserted copyright infringement, violations of the Lanham
286. For a detailed discussion on copyrights, see supra notes 54-129 and ac-
companying text. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1990) (detailing requirements for original
works to be eligible for copyright protection).
287. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (providing that expressions are
only protected if copy is almost identical); see also supra notes 89-129 and accompa-
nying text (detailing application of various tests for determining "substantial simi-
larity" in copyrights).
288. See Rice v. Fox Broad., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1038 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (spec-
ifying that special was created for broadcast).
289. See generally id. at 1035-37 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (noting that video was pro-
duced and distributed in 1986).
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Act, unjust enrichment, and violation of the California Unfair Busi-
ness Practices Act, among other claims. 29 0
In this suit, Rice did not claim to own the rights to the effects
performed and exposed in the Video and the Special.29 1 Instead,
Rice claimed that he had rights to the character of the performer
and to the dialogue, mood, pace, setting, and sequence of events in
the Video. 29 2 One illusion was a version of "Sawing Through a Wo-
man," which had been patented by Horace Goldin in the 1920S.293
Both shows also featured a "Lady into Tiger" illusion, an act of levi-
tation, and the "Zig Zag Lady."294 The court found the illusions
themselves to be in the public domain, and treated both works, the
Video and the Special, as compilations of un-copyrightable ele-
ments. 295 Accordingly, that court applied the law from Feist, which
held that there was no infringement where un-copyrightable facts
were copied.296 The Rice court acknowledged that:
Though Plaintiffs video is obviously more creative and
original than a typical factual compilation, or the tele-
phone directory which was at issue in Feist .. . it is certainly
analogous in the sense that Plaintiff may not rely on the
tricks themselves to show substantial similarity, and must
290. See id. at 1033 (acknowledging that four state-law claims have been
dismissed).
291. See id. at 1033, 1039 (discussing parties' disputes concerning presenta-
tion style, order of tricks, music, and camera angles).
292. For a discussion of copyright infringement regarding secret elements,
see supra note 283-285 and accompanying text. See also Rice, 148 F. Supp. 2d at
1040 (recognizing plaintiffs argument identifying similarities to be in "costume,
social standing, and the respective roles of the two men in the two presentations").
293. See Rice, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 1036-38 (noting the order of illusion and
whether or not illusion was revealed in respective shows); U.S. Patent No.
1,458,575 (filed Sept. 9, 1921).
294. See Rice, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 1036-38 (comparing which illusions were
featured and order in which illusions appeared in respective shows). Each show
also featured illusions not performed in the other. Id. In "Zig Zag Lady," a woman
steps into an upright cupboard, the magician closes the door, pushes blades
through her chest and hips, and slides the middle section out to the side, showing
she has been divided into three parts. The magician pushes the center section
back, removes the blades, and opens the door, allowing the woman to step out,
whole and in one piece.
295. See id. at 1054 ("[I]t is undisputed that Plaintiff may claim no right to the
particular tricks (or their explanations) which are included in both the Rice Video
and the first episode of the Television Specials. These are apparently in the public
domain."). For discussion of two-pronged extrinsic and intrinsic test, see supra
notes 102-111 and accompanying text.
296. See Rice, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 1050-54 (citing Feist Publ'n, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)) (noting only copyrightable material can be
copywritten). For a further discussion of Feist, see supra notes 98-101 and accompa-
nying text detailing substantial similarity test Court applied.
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rely on the sequence of those tricks, on the parameters
within which they are presented, and on elements of the
Rice Video aside from the tricks which are distinctive/
original.297
The court then compared the performances element by ele-
ment.29 8 First, as discussed previously, it considered the main char-
acter, the Mystery Magician. 299 The court found that Rice's Mystery
Magician lacked sufficient definition to be copyrightable, since it
was more of an archetype of a magician, a cipher, rather than a
unique, identifiable character with qualities that remain constant
over several works.30 The court noted that if Sam Spade, protago-
nist of "The Maltese Falcon," was not copyrightable outside of that
work, then the Rice's Mystery Magician certainly did not merit that
protection.3 1
Next, the court considered the dialogue or monologue in each
piece, holding that an identical, or at least "substantially similar,"
script was required in order to qualify as infringement. 0 2 The
court noted that finding infringement based on scripts being simi-
lar in theme or effect would be too close to granting protection for
the underlying ideas, and that protection was also prohibited be-
cause various speeches by the Mystery Magician qualified as scines d
faire, in the sense that any performance revealing how magic tricks
worked would likely include speeches
[A]bout how tricks have been passed down through the
ages, along with the 'magicians' code' that the secrets of
those tricks should never be revealed to the viewing public
[or] a closing speech about wanting to inspire viewers ...
to love and appreciate magic and magicians.303
The court also considered the moods of the two performances,
finding them to be dissimilar: the Video was detailed and careful,
297. Rice, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 1054 (citation omitted).
298. See id. at 1055-60 (detailing court's "analytic dissection" according to
video's elements).
299. See id. at 1055-58 (discussing character of Mystery Magician as first
element).
300. See id. at 1056-58 (determining ubiquitous nature of masked magician
character).
301. See id. at 1056 (citing Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys.,
Inc., 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954)) (distinguishing "The Maltese Falcon" from
mystery magician).
302. See id. at 1058 (denying plaintiffs claim of substantial similarity in
dialogue).
303. Id.
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while the Special was "sarcastic, even cynical.3 O4 But even if the
moods were similar, the court would have considered that to be an
unprotectable element, since a mood of secrecy and mystery would
naturally go with a show about revealing magic.3 1o5 The court also
found no similarity in the settings of the two performances, as the
Video took place in an empty theater and the Special was set in an
empty warehouse. 01 The court noted that any similarity related to
the use of a "secret night-time setting" qualified as a "scdne a faire"
and was not worthy of protection.307
Finally, the court compared the similarity of the "overall se-
quence of events" of the specials.308 While Rice attempted to com-
pare the two works at a general level, the court desired a much
narrower comparison.o30  Rice pointed to the opening shots of both
works as evidence of similarity.310 In the Video, the opening scene
shows the protagonist performer's feet walking down a dark street
outside the theater in which the action takes place, and the Special
begins with the narrator walking into view in a warehouse.31' In-
stead of being swayed, the court found these scenes to be evidence
of the differences between the two works, as the Video had no nar-
rator appearing on-screen.31 2
Once the court eliminated every other basis for claiming copy-
rights to the Video, it noted that Rice's only remaining claim must
be based on "some direct copying in the way in which the tricks are
revealed, the dialogue associated therewith, the sequence in which
the tricks are revealed, or some other aspect of the particular 'per-
formance' which is captured on the Rice Video."313 The two works
had only five tricks in common.314 None of the five were per-
formed identically in both works.3 15 The court noted that the tricks
304. Id.
305. Id. at 1058-59.
306. Id. at 1059.
307. See id. (emphasizing ubiquity of dark, secret settings among magic
shows).
308. See id. at 1059-60 (listing plaintiffs claims for similarity in plots).
309. See id. at 1059-61 (requiring less "elevated level of abstraction" for simi-
larity analysis).
310. See id. at 1060 (recounting one of plaintiffs listed commonalities).
311. See id. (describing opening scenes).
312. See id. ( " [T] his points out one of the ways in which the 'plot'/'sequence'
of these two works is decidedly not 'substantially similar': there is an on-screen host
in the Television Specials, who is given at least as significant a role in the develop-
ment of the 'plot' as is the Masked Magician himself.").
313. Id. (emphasis in original).
314. See id. (noting number of tricks shared by works).
315. See id. (comparing performance of magic tricks in videos at issue).
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were not performed in the same order, nor was the dialogue during
the performances substantially similar.316 Looking at all of these
factors, the court found that there was not sufficient similarity be-
tween the two performances to find copyright infringement.317
Glazer v. Hoffman, discussed previously, a 1943 case from the
Supreme Court of Florida, is based on outdated law, but still illus-
trates how copyright claims of novelty artists have been treated by
the courts.3 1 8 Hoffman's copyright was found only to apply to the
speech he gave before beginning his performance and not to the
performance, as the performance was not a "dramatic composition"
within the protection of the then-existing Federal copyright laws.3 19
The Hoffman court also stated that a performer only held rights to a
creation before its "publication or dedication to the public," and
that by performing his act, "the trick or stunt became the property
of the general public" and Hoffman had terminated any rights he
may have had to the act under the common law and relevant stat-
utes.32 1o While the court granted Hoffman protection for the intro-
duction to his performance and for his trade name "Think-a-Drink
Hoffman," the plaintiff in the case, Mr. Glazer, was allowed to con-
tinue performing the "Any Drink Called For" act, which received no
protection.321
Even with the later addition of copyright protection for
pantomimes, magicians and other variety artists will have a hard
time gaining copyright protection for their work for the same rea-
sons Rice had difficulty - the merger of ideas and expression and
the "sednes d faire" doctrine. For example, the idea of juggling a
bowling ball, a chainsaw and a hedgehog cannot be copyrighted,
because it is an idea. Any performer trying to protect such an act
will have trouble, because the choreography of juggling would
likely be considered to merge with the idea, just as a list of ingredi-
ents merges with the idea of making the cake. Also, as in Rice, the
316. See id. at 1060-61 (finding differences between two videos' presentation
of magic tricks).
317. See id. at 1061 (rejecting claim anyjuror could find substantial similarity,
and therefore copyright infringement).
318. See generally Glazer v. Hoffman, 16 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1943). For a full
description of the case, see supra notes 184-194 and accompanying text.
319. See Glazer, 16 So. 2d at 55 (concluding Hoffman failed to bring act within
terms of copyright statute).
320. See id. (stating act became property of general public after public
performance).
321. See id. at 55-56 (requiring performer to use own name and not appropri-
ate good reputation of another). For a further discussion of the details and hold-
ing of the case, see supra notes 184-194 and accompanying text.
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"scnes dfaire" doctrine will work against protecting novelty perform-
ances because many of these acts tap into traditions and refer to
themes with which audiences are familiar. This may make the acts
uncopyrightable. As Rice discovered, these doctrines will make
only the most perfect plagiarists liable for copyright infringement.
b. Right of Publicity
The right of publicity is not as well defined as copyright, but it
is unlikely to provide more protection for the particular interests of
variety performers. The foundational right of publicity case,
Zacchini, involved the unauthorized use of a video recording of
Zacchini's human cannonball act.322 The Supreme Court specifi-
cally noted that the facts of Zacchini did not require them to con-
sider if the performer's right of publicity could prevent the
television station from putting on its own, competing, human can-
nonball display.323 Zacchini also only involved damages, not an in-
junction.124 Hugo Zacchini was not seeking to prevent the
television station from using the tape of his act; he only asked that it
compensate him for airing the tape. 325
This holding is of limited utility for variety artists. Zacchini does
not address whether a variety artist with an original act can require
other performers to pay to imitate that act, or whether the artist can
enjoin other performers from using the act at all.32 6 The Supreme
Court did point to some arguments for allowing injunctions, such
as the similarity between the goals of the right of publicity and copy-
right and patent laws. 327 However, the Court also noted the goal of
allowing the public to benefit from the creation, indicating a pref-
erence for disseminating the work as far as possible and a predispo-
sition against allowing the creator of the act to enjoin other
322. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). For a
further discussion of the case, see supra notes 216-235.
323. See id. at 577 n.13 (detailing arguments that copyright law does not vio-
late First Amendment because no restrictions are placed on communication of
ideas or concepts).
324. See id, at 578 ("Petitioner does not seek to enjoin the broadcast of his
performance; he simply wants to be paid for it.").
325. See id. (acknowledging that petitioner wants commercial value of his act
recognized).
326. See id. at 578-79 (limiting evaluation to specific remedy sought by
petitioner).
327. See id. at 576 (asserting enforceable right of publicity, like copyright and
patent laws, provides economic incentive for performer to create).
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performances.3 2 8 In light of Zacchini, it is unclear, in the variety arts
context, if imitators would have to pay the originator of the act.
E. Protecting Jokes
Variety and novelty performers spend a lot of time testing new
jokes, playing with exactly the best words for a punch line, and try-
ing to figure out what will get the biggest reaction from their audi-
ence.329 While protection for a joke is unlikely, it is possible.
Comedian Jeff Foxworthy is best known for his "redneck" stand-up
comedy routine, built around jokes like: 'You might be a redneck if
... you've ever financed a tattoo," 'You might be a redneck if ...
your dog and your wallet are both on a chain," and "You might be a
redneck if . .. your dad walks you to school because you're in the
same grade."3 3 0 Taking advantage of Foxworthy's popularity, a
company called Custom Tees started printing shirts with text like:
"If you've ever financed a tattoo . . . you might be a redneck." 3 '
Foxworthy succeeded in getting a preliminary injunction against
Custom Tees.33 2 In his suit, Foxworthy claimed a common-law
trademark in the phrase: "you might be a redneck." 33 After
Foxworthy commenced his suit, Custom Tees started printing shirts
with the phrase "you ain't nothing but a redneck" instead of "you
might be a redneck."3 34
Because Foxworthy had not registered the phrase as a trade-
mark, he relied on section 43(a) of the Lanham Act in his suit.33 5
Section 43(a) grants protection to unregistered marks if the unau-
thorized use would be "likely to cause confusion .. . as to the origin,
328. See id. at 576-77 (stating that patent, copyright, and publicity laws ad-
vance public welfare by encouraging production of works that advance science and
useful arts).
329. See e.g., TIE ARISTOCRATS (Lion's Gate Pictures 2005). This documentary
illustrates this developmental process as it follows many performers telling their
versions of the samejoke. The comedians tinker with the joke's progression while
competing to make their retelling the most vile and disgusting. The author cau-
tions that nearly everyone will find this film offensive.
330. See Foxworthy v. Custom Tees, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 1200, 1204 (N.D. Ga.
1995) (providing background information on plaintiffs popularity as performer
and style of humor).
331. See id. (summarizing events that led to litigation).
332. See id. at 1200 (noting Foxworthy's successful attempt to prevent com-
pany's use of phrase associated with his act).
333. See id. at 1209 (explaining Foxworthy's belief that he had valid claim for
common law trademark over phrase).
334. See id. at 1204 (noting slight change in language used by Custom Tees
following commencement of lawsuit).
335. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006); Foxworthy, 879 F. Supp. at
1209 (explaining purpose of Lanham Act and its application in this case).
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sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commer-
cial activities by another person."-- 6 Without a registered trade-
mark, the court first considered whether Foxworthy had a mark
eligible for protection.33 7 The court found that "you might be a
redneck" was Foxworthy's catch phrase, the "hook" that made his
act unique. 3 He used this phrase as the title of his first book, his
national tour, his "platinum selling album," his Showtime special,
and his "page-a-day" calendar.339 The court noted that while "you
might be a redneck" may have a functional element as the set-up
for ajoke, it also served to distinguish Foxworthy's act from the acts
of others performing in the redneck comedy genre.3 40
Next, the court considered the likelihood of confusion. 34 1 The
court found "you might be a redneck" to be a suggestive mark, re-
quiring the public to "use their imaginations . . . to discern the
content of the humor . . . ."342 When the court considered the
similarity between Foxworthy's punch line and the phrase used on
the shirts, it looked at more than the actual words, stating "[T]he
issue is the result [of the phrase], not the precise language."3 43 In
the context of mocking rednecks, phrases creating "a 'test' . . . for
whether one is a redneck" are similar.3 44 In the rest of the court's
analysis, none of the factors favored Custom Tees, and the court
granted Foxworthy the injunction.345 The court also granted an in-
336. Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006) (stating application of
statute).
337. See Foxworthy, 879 F. Supp. at 1209-11 (examining whether Foxworthy
had trademark to protect).
338. See id. at 1210 (establishing that phrase was specific to Foxworthy's
routine).
339. See id. (listing examples of Foxworthy's use of phrase).
340. See id. at 1211 (noting unique element of Foxworthy's routine).
341. See id. at 1212-17 (articulating next step in court's test). For a further
discussion of the Eleventh and Ninth Circuit's differing tests, see supra notes 48-50
and accompanying text. The Eleventh Circuit Conagra test includes:
(1) strength of plaintiffs mark
(2) degree of similarity between the two marks
(3) similarity between the products or services
(4) similarity of target market
(5) similarity of advertising
(6) intention of defendants- were they looking to free ride on the
association
(7) actual confusion.
Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508, 1514 (11th Cir. 1984).
342. See Foxworthy, 879 F. Supp. at 1212 (highlighting connection between
phrase and intended humorous effect).
343. See id. at 1213 (reciting court's focus on meaning behind language).
344. See id. (establishing similarity between Foxworthy's phrase and Custom
Tee's phrase).
345. See id. at 1212-17 (detailing court's rationale and eventual holding).
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junction for Foxworthy's copyright claim, holding that he was enti-
tled to protection on his 'punch lines,' since they were original
expressions of the jokes' ideas.3 46
Jeff Foxworthy's victory is unlikely to help many other variety
artists, since, even in 1995, he was more famous than the vast major-
ity of variety artists and had marketed his catchphrase in a variety of
forms all over the country.347 The comedian prevailed because of
his fame, his ubiquitous use of the "you might be a redneck"
phrase, and because the copying shirts printed his jokes
verbatim. 348
As demonstrated in Rice, Foxworthy, and Hoffman, the standard
for protecting pieces of an act is very high. 349 First, because words
and short phrases are generally not copyrightable.3 50 Also, after fil-
tering out ideas, expressions that merge with those ideas, and
"scines dfaire," very little would be left to protect. Finally, few variety
performers have the notoriety and exposure that allowed
Foxworthy to protect his catchphrase based on a common law
trademark claim and the Lanham Act.35'
F. Protecting a Gimmick
In the musical Gypsy!, Mazeppa tells the young woman about to
become the famous stripper Gypsy Rose Lee, that in order to be a
success, " [w] hat you need is an idea-something that's gonna make
your strip . . . special!"35 2 Many variety artists similarly attempt to
make their act unique. Performers will try to distinguish their act
with a gimmick-a signature look, feat, or other element that will
346. See id. at 1217-19 (explaining court's decision to grant injunction and
rationale).
347. For a discussion of fame and its effects on copyright claims, see supra
notes 330-346 and accompanying text.
348. For a discussion of publicity and its effects on copyright claims, see supra
notes 329-351 and accompanying text.
349. See generally Glazer v. Hoffman, 16 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1943) (articulating
standards for offering protection to pieces of acts); Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 148 F.
Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (giving more examples of high standard);
Foxworthy v. Custom Tees, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 1200 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (rearticulating
same issue). For a further discussion of Glazer, see supra notes 184-194. For a fur-
ther discussion of Rice, see supra notes 195-200. For a further discussion of
Foxworthy, see supra notes 329-351.
350. See Signo Trading Intern. Ltd. v Gordon, 535 F. Supp 362, 365 (N.D. Cal.
1981) (discussing characteristics of copyrightable works); see also 37 CFR § 202.1.
351. For a further discussion of the Foxworthy matter, see supra, notes 332-352
and accompanying text.
352. Gypsy! (Warner Bros. Pictures 1962). "You Gotta Get a Gimmick," lyrics
by Stephen Sondheim.
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make their performance stand out from the rest, make them spe-
cial, and help them get work.
Copyright laws will most likely be useless to protect the signa-
ture aspect of the act, since the expression will almost certainly
merge with the idea, and thus cannot be protected by copyright.
Although performers may think of their gimmick as their "trade-
mark," trademark law will also not provide any protection for a sig-
nature acrobatic feat, for example.3 53 Unfair competition may be
the legal theory that would give a performer the best chance of pro-
tecting his or her signature performance. 354 In DeCosta v Columbia
Broadcasting Systems, Inc.,355 creating a character with a distinctive
name, slogan, or costume was found to be enough to qualify for
protection.3 5 i The court identified a number of factors which came
into play: whether the plaintiff had rights to the original perform-
ance, whether there had been misappropriation by the defendant,
whether there had been any palming off (putting one party's name
on work done by another party), and whether there was a likeli-
hood of confusion between the two acts.35 7 Even though the defen-
dant prevailed in that case, that cause of action leaves others hope.
IV. INTERNATIONAL SOURCES OF PROTECTION FOR VARIETY ARTISTS
A. Moral rights
Some countries recognize the "moral rights" of creators over
their artistic works, including (1) the right for the creator of a work
to be recognized as that work's author; (2) the right to determine
when a work is complete, such as the right of final cut; (3) the right
to decide whether, how, and when a work may be published or oth-
erwise made available to the public; and (4) the right to prevent
others from editing, mutilating, or otherwise changing a completed
work.35 8 For example, the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works grants authors a limited version of
moral rights when it provides for "the right to claim authorship of
353. For a further discussion of U.S. copyright and trademark law, see supra,
notes 54-133 and accompanying text.
354. For a description of Unfair Competition, see supra notes 130-152 and
accompanying text.
355. 520 F.2d 499 (1st Cir. 1975).
356. See id. at 512-13 (1st Cir. 1975) (discussing protection under common
law trademark doctrine).
357. See id. at 513 (listing factors to determine copyright protection).
358. See generally JEREMY PHILLIPS & ALISON FIRTH, INTRODUCrION TO INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY LAW (Butterworths 4th ed. 2001) (discussing copyright protection
in foreign countries).
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the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modifi-
cation of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work,
which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation."3 59 Tradi-
tionally, the United States has not recognized such rights.
Even the moral rights of the Berne Convention provide little
protection for variety artists. It is not clear variety artists would be
considered authors under the convention, as that term is not specif-
ically defined, and if they were included, the terms of the conven-
tion may or may not be extended to create a right to prevent others
from imitating their performances.
B. United Kingdom's Dramatic and Musical Performers' Act
The United Kingdom has a long history of variety artists per-
forming in its music halls, but it has not provided any better for
them in its laws. For example, in 1925, Parliament passed the Dra-
matic and Musical Performers' Act ("DMPA"), which created crimi-
nal liability for making and selling unauthorized recordings of
artists' performances. 6 0 The DMPA provided performers with little
satisfaction. It created only criminal, and not civil, liability, leaving
performers without individual recourse.3 6' The court in Musical
Performers' Protection Association Ltd v. British International Pictures
Ltd.,3 62determined that a group of musicians did not have a private
cause of action under the DMPA to sue a film production company
for using a recording of the musicians' performance. The court
reasoned that under the DMPA, any fines imposed under the stat-
ute were paid to the government, and not to the artist, indicating
the performers had no property right in their performance, and
thus no right to sue.3 63
C. The Rome Convention
In 1961, the International Convention for the Protection of
Performers, Producers of Phonograms, and Broadcasting Organiza-
tions ("Rome Convention") was held in Rome and resulted in the
addition of thirty-four new articles providing additional protections
359. See generally, Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works, art. 6 § 1, Sept. 9, 1886.
360. See generally, Dramatic and Musical Performers Act, 1925, H.C. Deb., Vol.
185, ser. 5, cols. 1790-91 (Eng.) (criminalizing making and selling unauthorized
recordings).
361. See e.g., Musical Performers' Prot. Assoc. Ltd v. British Int'l Pictures Ltd.,
(1930) 46 T.L.R. 485 (noting Act's lack of civil redress).
362. (1930) 46 T.L.R. 485.
363. See id. at 485-97 (discussing lack of civil recourse for performer).
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beyond traditional copyrights. 3 64 The Rome Convention, however,
made the protection of variety artists optional, providing only the
"possibility of protecting" those performers against the "broadcast-
ing and the communication to the public" of their work without
their permission if: (i) the original fixation was made without their
consent; (ii) if the reproduction is made for purposes different
from those for which the performers gave their consent" or, (iii) if
the original fixation qualified as fair use, but the later use of the
fixation does not qualify for that exception.3 65 The Intergovern-
mental Committee of the Rome Convention drafted a Model Law
in 1964 from which the signatory countries could work to create
their own laws.3 66 The Model Law, if adopted, would make protec-
tions more definite than the Convention, alone. It provided,
among other things, that "[w]ithout the authorization of the per-
formers, no person shall [fix an] unfixed performance."3 67 The ef-
fect of this Model Law would be similar to the effect of Zacchini. 3 6 8
It would provide little protection against imitation by other
performers.
However, Zacchini himself would still be out of luck. The Con-
vention explicitly restricts its protections to "performers," defined
as "actors, singers, musicians, dancers, and other persons who act,
sing, deliver, declaim, play in, or otherwise perform literary or artis-
tic works."3 69 The Rome Convention treats variety artists as a sepa-
rate category. Article nine, titled "Variety and Circus Artists,"
provides that "Any Contracting State may, by its domestic laws and
regulations, extend the protection provided for in this Convention
to artists who do not perform literary or artistic works."37 o
The Rome Convention might have provided more protection
for variety artists, but those performers were deliberately omitted
from the Convention. During the negotiations, Austria proposed
widening the application of the rule to "literary or artistic recita-
tions, presentations or performances of all kinds," but the proposal
364. International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms, and Broadcasting Organizations [herinafter Rome Convention],
Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43 (discussing Rome Convention).
365. See id. § 7.
366. See id.
367. Id. art. 7.
368. For a further discussion of Zacchini, see supra notes 217-133 and accom-
panying text. The United States is not a signatory to the Rome Convention.
369. Rome Convention, supra note 364, art. 3(a).
370. Id. art. 9 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 19: p. 73
52
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol19/iss1/3
2012] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW FOR THE VARIETY ARTS
was voted down.3 7 ' Austria later proposed that the protections ap-
ply to "anyone who takes part as an artist in the performance or
presentation of a literary or artistic work or a variety show."3 7 2 That
suggestion was also rejected, leaving protection for the work of vari-
ety artists out completely.
D. Dutch Copyright Law
A Dutch court recently addressed this very issue. In November,
2011, a Dutch court found a magician had infringed on the copy-
right of another magician who used to work with him. 7 3 Rafael van
Herck sued his former employer, Hans Klok, for performing a se-
quence of illusions in the manner originated by von Herck.3 7 4 One
of von Herck's claims was based on copyright law. While much of
the proceedings were kept under wraps, due to the parties' desire
to keep the details of the illusions secret, the rough Google Transla-
tion of the von Herck court's decision reflects a process similar to
the United States' copyright analysis.3 7 5
The Dutch court noted that while the basic illusions alone
(thrusting a hand through a person's torso or knocking a person's
head off their shoulders and restoring it) may not be protected, the
routine and story created by Herck in performing them involved
"creative choices," effectively making the performance a "play"
which had been imitated by Klok without permission.3 7 6 Herck was
awarded damages and costs, totaling approximately $16,725.377
V. THE BENEFITS AND PROBLEMS OF ADDING
ADDITIONAL PROTECTIONS
Having explored how current intellectual property laws pro-
vide little protection for variety artists, the next question is whether
371. Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the International Protection
of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Rome,
10 to 26 Oct. 1961. CDR/23, at 208.
372. Id. at CDR/49, at 209.
373. See Abracadabra! Dutch Court Fines Magician Over Act, CBS (Nov. 9, 2011,
10:11am), http://www.cbsnews.comn/8301-501714 162-57321353/abracadabra-
dutch-court-fines-magician-over-act/ [hereinafter Abracadabra!] (outlining hold-
ing of Dutch court with respect to copying of prior sequence of live performance).
374. Id.
375. Judgment Interim Order of November 9, 2011, District Court, The
Hague, 404 011/KG ZA 11-1144, available at http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/detail
page.aspx?ljn=BU3795
376. Id. at 1 4.6, note 4.
377. See Abracadabra!, supra note 369 (explaining Herck's damages for copy-
ing of his live, creative performance).
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those artists would benefit from additional protections, and if so,
what those protections should be. Some variety artists perform a
piece the same way it has been performed for decades. Others cre-
ate new material. Some of those inventors suffer when other per-
formers copy their carefully crafted material, when cut-rate
manufacturers knock off their designs, or when students of the art
illegally download their instructional videos from file-sharing net-
works. This section explores the potential benefits and damages
that could arise from adding intellectual property protections by
using magicians as a sample case.37 8
As discussed above, one purpose of intellectual property law is
to encourage creativity in the arts. 79 The Supreme Court noted in
Zacchini, that for an artist to invest the time and work to create a
performance, he would require "his commercial stake in his act [to
be] appropriately recognized."o38 1 There is currently a great deal of
unauthorized copying within the magic world. Instructional videos
made by magicians for sale to the trade are swapped on file-sharing
networks. On occasion, when a rising star appears with a unique
act, a rash of similar acts appear shortly afterwards. Anecdotal evi-
dence speaks of magicians giving up on the art because they could
not "reap the reward of their endeavors."38'
Without additional intellectual property protection, the risk re-
mains that magicians will see what they perceive to be their proprie-
tary work copied by other performers. However, adding new
intellectual property protections could also interfere disastrously
with how magicians learn, work, and create new material. There is
no lack of creativity in the magic community. To the contrary, the
lack of protection appears to be, on the whole, good for the art
form.
Magic is a remix culture. Innovative performers make use of
old ideas from different places put together in new ways. Adding
intellectual property protections would partition off these ideas,
make them inaccessible, and cut magicians off from vital source
378. The author is a magician, and is familiar with the workings of that com-
munity. While magic will be used as a representative example of the variety arts,
other variety arts communities may differ in how their arts are learned, developed,
passed on, and perpetuated, and accordingly, how they would benefit from or be
damaged by additional protections.
379. For a further discussion of this IP law, see supra notes 54-58 and accom-
panying text.
380. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977)
(noting performers' desire to receive payment for their performances).
381. See id. at 573 (explaining performers' need for financial benefit to justify
time spent planning and preparing performances).
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materials. For example, suppose a magician wants to create a per-
formance in which a selected card reappears in different places,
over and over. There are many known techniques for getting a
spectator to pick a particular card, for shuffling cards, and for
manipulating a chosen card to appear in different places. A magi-
cian may select a shuffle from one source, a cut from another, or a
showy fan found elsewhere. All of these elements may combine to
create a unique routine even though the building blocks have ex-
isted for years. Having to determine the origin of each technique,
let alone obtain the rights to use these building blocks, would be
prohibitively difficult.
Since Scot's Discoverie of Witchcraft was published in 1584, magi-
cians have studied books that collect and explain principles and
tricks.382 Many instructional books, including most of those availa-
ble in mainstream bookstores and public libraries, compile material
from a variety of sources, with no information regarding the origin
of the magic tricks discussed. For example, one classic text is the
Tarbell Course in Magic, a six volume set first published in 1927 and
still commonly used by magicians.383 These books are encyclope-
dias of magic tricks and techniques, many of which are still regu-
larly used in performances today. Tarbell was not the originator of
this material, but he cited no sources for his information. Another
example is The Expert at the Card Table, written by S.W. Erdnase, a
seminal work on card manipulation. 3 4 Erdnase was a pen-name,
and although there are several theories regarding his identity, no
one has been able to definitively determine who he was, let alone
find his heirs to license the material in his book. With resource
materials like these, it would be practically impossible for a magi-
cian to determine, with any level of certainty, what rights had to be
obtained, and from whom, in order to perform this material.
It is also common for inventors of magic material to write mag-
azine articles or books about their innovative creations, or to mar-
ket instructional videos through websites or specialty shops. Some
magicians make a significant portion of their income selling in-
structional materials to other magicians. Generally, originating ma-
gicians do not publish their innovative material until they are ready
to allow others to perform it, and it is also general practice for ma-
382. See REGINALD SCOT, DISCOVERIE OF WITCHCRAFT (1584) (illustrating one
of first published books on witchcraft and magic tricks).
383. See HARLAN TARBELL, TARRELL COURSE IN MAGIC (D. Robbins & Co., Inc.,
1999) (giving example of magic trick).
384. See S.W. ERDNASE, EXPERT AT THE CARD TABLE (Dover Publications, 1995)
(providing second example of magic trick with cards).
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gicians to purchase those magazines, books, or videos with the ex-
pectation that they have the right to perform the effects described.
These books and videos, which show and explain a perform-
ance in detail, serve to fix a performance, as required by current
copyright law, to gain protection for the performance. So, ironi-
cally, by writing the book or filming the video, the author may gain
the right to prevent purchasers from performing- the presented
magic effects, if the imitation is sufficiently close and the protection
sufficiently broad. If authors pursued and enforced those rights,
magicians would have to contact the author and obtain a license to
perform the material or risk being sued. While it is possible for
some to seek licenses, it seems more likely that magicians would
ignore the licensing requirements and follow tradition instead. An
author would then have the option to sue the people who pur-
chased his book and performed the magic without an additional
license. This could result in negative publicity and customer back-
lash.38 5 Whether magicians respect a licensing requirement or fear
being sued by the author, separating the right to perform the magic
effects described in the book from the purchase of the book would
probably also destroy the market for new instructional books and
videos.
Some magicians who author instructional books and videos
also complain that their materials are illicitly copied, and their
videos are being duplicated or shared online. Those authors have a
clear recourse. Just as the music and film industries have sued peo-
ple who share files of movies and music, these authors can sue copi-
ers and file-sharers for copyright infringement. Nevertheless, in a
relatively small community like that of magicians, a backlash from
potential customers could be very damaging.
The fashion industry is currently going through a similar de-
bate. Fashion is also an industry built on copying and combining
elements. 3 8 6 The lack of intellectual property protection for cloth-
ing designs allows many designers and retailers to offer similar gar-
ments, allowing fashion fads to change rapidly, in turn boosting
sales in the garment industry as a whole. Top designers' expensive
garments appear on the runway and red carpet. While not every-
385. It is debatable whether a magic club, for example, would invite, or hire, a
magician to lecture to and teach its members if the lecturer had a reputation for
suing his students.
386. See David Bollier & Laurie Racine, Control of Creativity? Fashion's Secret,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Sept. 9, 2003), www.csmonitor.com/2003/0909/p09
sO-coop.html (discussing fashion industry's acceptance of derivation and collabo-
ration as creative tools).
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one can afford the couture gown worn by the Oscar nominee, many
women will buy a similar style dress featured in a fashion magazine
the next month. This is possible because there is currently no intel-
lectual property law covering clothing designs that prevents manu-
facturers from quickly selling designs similar to the dress of the
moment, or the newjean/tight hybrid pant.3 87 Some designers are
seeking additional intellectual property laws to change that
situation.3 88
Other designers are fighting those changes out of concern that
giving one designer a monopoly over a fashion design would have a
damaging effect on innovation in the industry.38 9 For example,
some fear that this would be equivalent to one designer getting a
monopoly over the zipper. Also, forcing the copying to stop could
injure the industry. New fads drive sales, and it is debatable
whether new fads could develop if only one company made the
style, or only one store sold it. While all the reasons for concern in
the fashion industry may not directly apply to the variety arts, it is
certainly worth considering the benefits an industry or art receives
from allowing imitation.
There is also a question as to whether those who copy the work
of innovators are truly in competition with those innovators. Sup-
pose an innovator creates a new illusion, a new kind of box to use
for sawing a woman in half, for example. To obtain the prop from
the originator or licensed manufacturer would be quite expensive,
and a handful of the top tier of performers may take the risk of a
new, unproven apparatus and make the purchase. However, it will
not be too long before some manufacturer starts selling knock-offs
for much less, and a larger segment of the field may buy them. The
performers who purchase the knock-offs might have purchased the
originals, likely to be of higher quality and identifiable as originals
to those in the know, if they had the resources. These performers
may aspire to purchase the originals some day. Also, the knock-off
may provide greater exposure for the illusion because the more an
illusion is performed, the greater its exposure to potential
customers.
387. See id. (explaining that too much private control of fashion is harmful to
creativity).
388. See Kathleen Fasanella, Proposed Law to Destroy 90% of Design Business,
FASHION-INCUBATOR (May 14, 2009, 1:13 PM), www.fashion-incubator.com/
archive/proposed-law-to-destroy-90-of-design-businesses/ (discussing Design Piracy
Prohibition Act).
389. See, e.g., id. (detailing increased hardships on innovation).
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Some variety acts imitate an innovative performer's style,
theme, or hook. Occasionally, a performer gathers acclaim for an
act that has a unique gimmick.39 For example, a performer may
become prominent with an act where he produces medals, compact
discs, or other items not in common use at that time. Shortly, a
number of other magicians may start performing acts with similar
props. There is a strong argument that these imitators are free-
riding off of the work and notoriety of the original performer. As a
matter of policy, the law should protect the innovator and allow
him to reap the "reward of his endeavors."39' However, if imitators
take the idea and improve upon it, or add to it, then they are also
advancing the development of the art, which should be en-
couraged. While the perspectives of the innovators may vary, it is
not entirely clear whether it is in the innovator's best interest, or
whether it would benefit the art as a whole, to stop permitting copy-
ing completely.
Another possibility is that intellectual property protections
would become practically meaningless, given the general lack of re-
sources of many performers in the field. Only a few performers at
the very top would have the money to dedicate to pursuing a law-
suit, and many potential defendants would be effectively judgment
proof. Smaller, poorer, innovative magicians would likely be una-
ble to enforce their intellectual property rights against infringers
with greater resources. Similarly, smaller, poorer performers would
also be ill prepared to defend themselves even if they were in the
right. The availability of this monopoly would give bigger players
with more resources an enormous advantage over those without the
resources to defend themselves. As a result, the addition of intellec-
tual property protections would likely only advantage a few of the
largest players in the field, and would give no added incentives or
benefits to new players to enter the field and create.
Finally, magicians may not want the courts to be the arbiter of
these disputes. There is a great deal of risk in putting that power in
the hands of a fact finder who knows nothing about the art. Magi-
cians seeking to enforce or defend rights to their material would
have to explain the history and significance of developments in
magic to the court and would have to educate the fact finder about
how magic works, and why distinctions are vital or immaterial to the
390. For a further discussion of gimmicks, see supra notes 54-129, 353 and
accompanying text.
391. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co, 433 U.S. 562, 573 (explaining
goals of patent and copyright law).
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art form. Distinctions that may seem obvious or dramatic to one
immersed in the art may appear minimal or irrelevant to a non-
practitioner. Introducing the finders of fact to the culture and his-
tory of magic is a challenge not every potential litigant may want to
take on.
An alternative to legal protections would be an informal, inter-
nal enforcement of an ethics and standards code within the art.
Teller, of Penn & Teller, has referred to observance of the code
prohibiting imitation of a competitor's performance as "the gentle-
manly thing to do."3 9 2 While these governance mechanisms are not
as strong as the protections offered by intellectual property laws,
they are customized to the art, come directly from the community,
and may be enforced by those who are knowledgeable and commit-
ted to the craft. Their potential impact should not be
underestimated.
Recently, albeit outside of the world of variety arts, internal or
informal shaming and self-enforcement mechanisms have been
amazingly effective. Around November 4, 2010, Monica Gaudio, a
blogger and food writer, posted an entry on her blog describing her
interactions with the editor of a magazine called Cooks Source.39 3
Ms. Gaudio explained how she found that an article of hers had
been published without her consent in Cooks Source, both online
and in print.394 The article published by Cooks Source had appar-
ently been copied from a website owned by Ms. Gaudio.3 9 5
When Ms. Gaudio finally reached a Cooks Source editor, the edi-
tor declined to give her either an apology or compensation.396 In-
stead, the editor informed Ms. Gaudio that "the web is considered
public domain" and that she should be grateful Cooks Source had
even bothered to attach Ms. Gaudio's name to her work.39 7 Word
spread of Ms. Gaudio's situation, and people took action." 8 A
392. See Campbell Robertson, Dueling Magicians: Whose Tick is it Anyway?, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 27, 2006), www.nytimes.com/2006/09/27/theater/27magi.html (sug-
gesting gentlemanly way to act in magic industry).
393. See Copyright Infingement and Me, ILADORE'S HousE, o CRACK (Nov. 3,
2010, 11:14 PM), illadore.livejournal.com/30674.html (discussing contact with
editor).
394. See id. (describing discovery of article published without original author's
consent).
395. See id. (explaining where magazine found Gaudio's article).
396. See id. (summarizing Gaudio's phone conversation with editor). Gaudio
had requested a contribution to the Columbia School of Journalism as her
compensation.
397. See id. (showing editor's view of taking and using articles from internet).
398. See Dugald Baird, Cooks Source: US Copyright Complaint Sparks Twitter and
Facebook Storm, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2010), www.guardian.co.uk/media/pda/
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spoof Twitter account appeared, others tweeted comments with a
"#CrooksSource" hashtag, and the Cooks Source Facebook page be-
came overwhelmed with angry posts, including some blaming the
magazine for a wide and humorously unlikely variety of infamy, in-
cluding inventing Windows Vista and having been on the grassy
knoll.39 9 Some of those outraged searched the archives of Cooks
Source Magazine, finding and highlighting other instances where the
magazine potentially plagiarized, claiming to have identified over
one hundred and fifty instances where Cooks Source published ar-
ticles copied from the internet.4010 Other people contacted Cooks
Source's advertisers, and some advertisers pulled their ads.401 The
magazine has since folded.402
Similarly, magicians have attempted to enforce copyright pro-
tections on a smaller scale. Upon hearing that a publisher was sell-
ing copies of a book containing unauthorized material originally
written by a recently deceased magician, several members of the
community contacted magic retailers to ask them not to carry the
book. Many retailers agreed not to carry or sell the book. While it
is unclear how many retailers cooperated, it does appear that the
community is capable of enforcing its ethics when a large enough
group is sufficiently offended. The magic community has histori-
cally been effective at maintaining the secrets of the trade, for ex-
ample, and discouraging their exposure to the public.
While the current, open, cooperative system does sometimes
permit free riders to benefit from the work of others, it makes inno-
vation and collaboration easier and less risky for variety artists and
does a better job of encouraging the creation of new works. While
some performers suffer economically and emotionally from seeing
2010/nov/04/cooks-source-copyright-complaint (detailing response to revelation
of magazine publishing articles without permission).
399. See id. (discussing storm of activity on Twitter); see also Cooks Source,
FACEBOOK, www.facebook.com/CooksSourceMagazine (last modified Nov. 7, 2010)
(showing deluge of comments on Facebook); Andrea James, More Cooks Source
Treachery Revealed!, BOINGBOING (Nov. 4, 2010, 8:49 PM), www.boingboing.net/
2010/11/04/more-cooks-source-tr.html (listing other revelations about Cooks
Source).
400. See Jeremy King, Comment to Cooks Source, FACE BOOK (Nov. 6, 2010,
10:18 AM), www.facebook.coin/CooksSourceMagazine (alleging extent of plagia-
rizing); see also Cooks Source Article Tracking, Goociur Docs, http://bit.ly/dDoxxP
(last visited Nov. 2, 2011) (listing allegedly infringing articles).
401. SeeJoshJasper, Copyright for Dummies, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY (Nov. 4, 2010),
blogs.publishersweekly.com/blogs/genreville/?p=851 (discussing advertisers that
pulled adds from magazine).
402. See Michelle Castillo, Top 25 Tech Fails of the Year: 22. Cook's Source Copy-
right Ignorance, TIME: TECHILAND (Dec. 22, 2010), techland.time.com/bps-machin-
ery/22-cooks-source-copyright-ignorance/ (showing failure of Cooks Source).
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their creative work used by others, the variety arts benefit from
granting inspired individuals unfettered access to communal knowl-
edge. Without additional legal protections, the community can still
enforce its ethics and standards through social pressures, which,
while imperfect, can be very effective. The benefits to the arts are
well worth the risk.
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